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DESCRIPTION OF THE BENCHMARK EXERCISE IN QUANTITATIVE 
AREA RISK ASSESSMENT 
1. BACKGROUND 
The JRC enlargement project, "Management of Natural and Technological Hazards" (Project 
PA No. 26: http://www.jrc.cec.eu.int/enlargement/jrc-projects.htm), was launched during the 
Fifth Framework Programme,  with the main objective of providing technical support to the 
EU Candidates Countries for the management of risk associated with natural and 
technological hazards, particularly in the area of data collection and information management 
systems. The project final report was published as a EUR document (EUR 20834 EN1). As a 
follow up to this activity, a strategy for future collaboration between the JRC and the 
Accession and Candidate Countries within the Sixth Framework Programme has been 
established. This was fully discussed and agreed with Accession and Candidate Countries’ 
participants in the Workshop on Collaborative Activities held in Ispra on 22-24 June 2003, 
where a detailed work programme was defined. The main focus was on data collection and 
analysis, information management systems and the development and application of risk 
assessment techniques in support to the management of natural and technological hazards. 
Amongst the specific topics identified during the Workshop, particular attention was given to 
the application of risk assessment techniques for the production of Safety Reports of Seveso 
II type establishments. 
 
Previous European benchmark studies coordinated by the JRC 2,3 provided a clear overview 
of the state-of-the-art of the various practices, methodologies and tools used in the different 
EU countries in the process of risk analysis of chemical establishments. These studies 
demonstrated the degree of uncertainty in the different phases of the risk analysis process and 
identified some of the main causes. In order to better understand the risk analysis practices 
and methodologies adopted in the Accession and Candidate Countries, it was agreed to launch 
a third benchmark exercise focusing on the evaluation of the risk of a particular area in the 
proximity of a hazardous establishment. Since the group of this Collaborative Activity 
consists of representatives of the National Competent Authorities, it was decided to organise 
this benchmark from the point of view of a competent authority inspector. Thus, unlike the 
previous benchmark exercises, where a full risk analysis was conducted on a reference 
chemical establishment, it was decided that the participants should make an independent 
review of the results of an existing risk analysis study, conducted by the plant operator, from 
an inspector perspective. 
 
The selected chemical establishment to be used as the reference plant for this benchmark was 
an actual lower tier Seveso II plant, which was highlighted by the Hungarian Competent 
Authority for the implementation of the Seveso II Directive (National Directorate General for 
Disaster Management). In order to ensure anonymity of the selected establishment, it was 
intentionally decided to modify the environmental setting in which the plant is located, the 
local vulnerability and the population density. This choice was driven by the necessity of 
avoiding that any outcome of the benchmark might be misinterpreted in terms of the actual 
risks associated with the territory where the reference plant is located.  
The reference risk analysis submitted to review was based on the risk analysis extracted from 
the existing safety report of the actual reference establishment. However some of the original 
                                                     
1  M. Wood, A. Vetere Arellano, F. Mushtaq, “ Management of Natural and Technological Hazards in Central and 
Eastern European Countries (PECO) , EUR 20834 EN  ”
2  A. Amendola, S. Contini, I. Ziomas, “Uncertainties in chemical risk assessment: results of a European 
benchmark exercise”, the Journal of Hazardous Materials. 29 (1992) 347-363  
3  K. Lauridsen, M. Christou, A. Amendola, F. Markert, I. Kozine, M.Fiori: “Assessing the Uncertainties in the 
Process of Risk Analysis of Chemical Establishments: Part I & II”, ESREL 2001, E.Zio, M.Demichela and 
N.Piccinini (eds.), Vol.1 pp.592-606 
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data, assumptions and calculations were suitably modified by the JRC with the main intention 
of making this analysis uncorrelated from the actual case. For this reason, it is possible to 
state unambiguously the non addressability of the conclusions of this study to the actual plant 
used as the reference plant. A point to note is that, such a re-elaboration of the original risk 
analysis to produce a consistent reference risk analysis would not have been possible without 
the assistance and the close co-operation with the consultant company, which produced the 
original safety report (CK-Trikolor Kft). This assistance was requested by the Hungarian 
Competent Authority, and was essential for the understanding of the risk assessment 
methodology that was used in the present case. 
  
To improve the inter-comparability of the results it was decided to select a single tool to 
present the risk analysis results. This is based on the ARIPAR methodology4, which provides 
also a powerful tool for evaluating the risk of a particular area in the proximity of a hazardous 
establishment arising from different risk sources. The use of ARIPAR provided a good 
example of a quantitative Area Risk Assessment application, which is essential to support any 
decision-making process involving the impact analysis of risk resulting from different 
sources, and the elaboration of alternative solutions for risk reduction.  
2. PROJECT OBJECTIVE  
The project activity consisted of a benchmark exercise for evaluating the risk of a hazardous 
establishment and the area risk resulting from it by using the ARIPAR 4.0 software package. 
More specifically the main objectives were as follows: 
 
• to conduct independent reviews by the different national teams of the reference risk 
analysis of a particular hazardous establishment (or part of it), as re-elaborated from the 
original safety report of the plant; 
• to assess the risk in the selected impact area.  
 
The main intention was to offer a general perspective on how independent reviews of the 
same risk analysis study, which are conducted from the competent authority’s standpoint, 
might differ form each other and be reflected in a different evaluation of the risk of a certain 
Seveso type establishment. The outcome of such an analysis has the evident advantage of 
contributing towards better understanding the inspection criteria and current practices used by 
the different national authorities.  
 
In addition, the study was also intended to provide a practical exercise of area risk assessment 
to assess the impact of an industrial site on the overall area affected by potential accidents and 
a first attempt to analyse how different reviews/interpretations of a specific risk study might 
be reflected in the estimate of area risk.  
 
A clear spin-off of this activity was the creation of a discussion platform about the current 
practices and approaches in the different represented Member States to evaluate the several 
aspects of a risk study for a Seveso-type establishment. 
3. SCOPE 
The benchmark was conducted on an industrial establishment existing in one of the countries 
participating in the exercise (Hungary).  
 
The selected establishment was a lower tier Seveso II plant (i.e. falling under Article 9 of the 
Seveso II Directive), thus ensuring that the facilities, systems and components and the 
                                                     
4  G.Spadoni, D. Egidi, S. Contini, “Through ARIPAR-GIS the quantified risk analysis supports land use planning 
activities”, Journal of Hazardous Material 71 (2000) 423-437 
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associated risks under investigation be realistic. In order to ensure anonymity of the selected 
establishment, it was intentionally decided to modify the environmental setting in which the 
plant is located, the local vulnerability and the population density. In this way it was possible 
to avoid that any outcome of the benchmark might be misinterpreted in terms of the actual 
risks associated with the territory where the reference plant is really located.  
4. ARIPAR METHODOLOGY 
ARIPAR is a quantitative area risk assessment tool used to evaluate the risk resulting from 
major accidents in industrial areas where hazardous substances are stored, processed and 
transported. It is based on a geographical information system platform (GIS). The application 
of this tool requires the quantification in terms of frequency and consequence of all significant 
accident Scenarios - identified by means of systematic techniques, e.g. Hazop and FMEA – in 
fixed installations and for the transport of dangerous substances. 
 
ARIPAR is based on a set of procedures designed to determine, through the combination of 
the occurrence frequency of postulated accidents and the associated consequences (i.e. 
causalities), the local, individual risk and societal risk.  Specifically the main phases of the 
ARIPAR risk analysis procedure can be summarised as follows:  
 
• Definition of the “impact area” and collection of all relevant territorial data (population 
density and distribution, vulnerability centres, meteorological data, transport). 
• Identification of industrial and transport activities involving dangerous substances and 
definition of all significant risk sources, which could affect the considered impact area. 
• Identification of potential accident Scenarios for all risk sources (toxic releases, fires and 
explosions). Assessment of their frequencies and consequences. 
• Calculation of the overall risk, which accounts of the possible non-symmetrical 
distribution of risk around the different risk sources.   
 
The ARIPAR methodology has already been applied to perform a quantitative assessment of 
the risks connected with processing, storage and transportation of dangerous substances in 
several industrial areas, and it has been demonstrated to be a very powerful tool also for 
managing industrial risk. Given the strong interest expressed by the representatives of 
Candidate and Accession Countries participating in this mutual collaboration programme, the 
JRC decided to translate the ARIPAR software package in English for its general use and 
distributed the resulting release (ARIPAR 3.0) to all the members in October 2002. 
Meanwhile a new and more advanced version of ARIPAR was developed (ARIPAR 4.0), 
which was distributed amongst the BEQUAR participants. In addition and in conjunction with 
this activity, a series of training modules were also organised for the participants in this 
benchmark. 
5. WORK PROGRAMME  
The project was structured in three main phases: a documentation phase and two working 
phases. 
5.1 Documentation phase 
The JRC together with the representative of the Country selected to provide the reference 
establishment, collected all relevant information on the involved installations. They produced 
an internal document that was distributed to the other members participating in the benchmark 
exercise5.  
 
This document contained: 
                                                     
5 Internal Document: BEQUAR RP Rev 1.0, Technical Note, April 2004 
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Territorial data  
• Topographic map of the hypothetical site. 
• Information on the meteorological conditions and atmospheric stability. 
• Population density.  
• Vulnerability data. 
 
Establishment data  
• Detailed description of the installations. 
• Layout diagrams.   
• Process and Instrumentation Diagrams (P&DI). 
 
Risk analysis data  
• Hazard Identification Analysis. 
• Frequencies of accident Scenarios (with information on existing mitigation measures and 
devices and related reliability and availability). 
• Damage profiles for each accident Scenario.  
 
The risk analysis data such as frequencies of initiating events, reliability/availability of safety 
measures, damage curves and probit functions were extracted from the original safety report 
of the reference establishment. They were then suitably modified and/or recalculated and, 
afterwards, distributed to the BEQUAR participants.  
 
After having examined the documentation the members were invited to a specific meeting 
organised by JRC and Hungarian Competent authority at the premises of the reference 
establishment in order to visit its installations and to better understand the processes involved. 
The possibility to ask specific questions to the plant operator was also given. Afterwards, 
questions and related answers were collected and circulated amongst all the members in order 
to assure uniform information about the reference installations.  
 
All relevant data extracted from the produced documentation were uploaded on ARIPAR and 
distributed to the members. 
5.2 Working phase I (Review of the risk analysis data) 
This second phase started with the definition of the main criteria for organising the review 
activity of the different BEQUAR members. Specifically their review, which were supposed 
to be totally independent from each other, focussed on: 
 
• Analysis of the postulated accidental Scenarios. 
• Frequencies of accident Scenarios. 
• Accident consequences. 
 
All the above elements are used as the input parameters for ARIPAR. The different teams 
made their review according to their own experience, methodologies and tools and they were 
given the possibility to introduce the modified data directly within ARIPAR. For instance, 
they could eliminate accidental Scenarios, which they would consider as not relevant, or 
introduce new ones, which they would judge as not taken into the right consideration by the 
operator. They were also allowed to modify frequency and vulnerability data, considered as 
not sufficiently conservative or inappropriate to the current situation.  
 
A point to note is that, due to the limited resources, it was decided to limit the review of the 
consequence analysis by focussing on the source terms and the vulnerability data (probit 
values & threshold limits).  The consequence damage profiles were, therefore, excluded from 
the review process. 
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5.3 Working phase II (Comparison of the different reviews and Area Risk 
Assessment) 
The JRC team made a comparison of the outcomes of the different reviews conducted by the 
participants. This analysis was particularly important in order to: 
 
• compare the different approaches adopted for assessing a risk analysis (databases, 
methods, procedures, models), 
• study the variability of the review outcome obtained by independent teams, with different 
national cultures, 
• study how some parameters (Scenarios, frequency or consequence outcome) can affect 
the area risk assessment (sensitivity analysis), 
• identify possible areas for improvement.  
 
• The results were examined during the several project meetings of BEQUAR.  
  
For confidentiality reasons, the selected establishment and its installations were kept secret. A 
secrecy agreement was by signed all participating organisations, which provided detailed 
information on all obligations and rights. 
6. FUNDING AND PARTICIPATION 
The BEQUAR activity was funded under the JRC Enlargement and Integration Action which 
aims at providing scientific and technological support for promoting integration of the New 
Member States (NMS) and assisting the Candidate Countries (CCs) on their way towards 
their accession to the European Union.  
 
JRC support for the CCs and NMS includes developing a pan-European science and 
technology reference system, a special focus on the transfer of the ‘acquis communautaire’ 
(the body of EU legislation and standards being implemented and monitored by the JRC), and 
contributing to the cohesiveness of the accession and integration process.  
 
The JRC has covered the travel and subsistence expenses for all invited experts who 
participated in the BEQUAR activity in accordance with the European Commission rules. On 
the other hand the invited experts provided their contribution in kind for all those activities 
related to the review of the risk analysis of the reference establishment. 
 
The following list provides the invited experts who actively participated in the benchmark 
exercise, with their affiliations: 
 
Bulgaria 
Tconka Dryankova,  Ministry of Environment and Water. 
 
Cyprus 
Themistoclis Kyriacou, Department of Labour Inspection. 
 
Hungary 
Sándor Czakó,  CK-Trikolor   
Lajos Kátai-Urbán/Zoltan Czeplo, National Directorate General for Disaster Management – 
Ministry of the Interior. 
 
Latvia 
Maigurs Ludbarzs, Strategy Division of Civil Protection Department.  
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Lithuania 
Vytis Kopustinskas, Lithuanian Energy Institute. 
Petras Voveris/Ausra Sablinskiene, Fire and rescue Department, Ministry of the Interior.  
 
Poland 
Adam Markowski, Technical University of Lodz. 
Andrzej Furtek, Centre of excellence MANHAZ (Management of Health and Environmental 
Hazards). 
 
Romania  
Alxandru Ozunu/ Septimius Mara,  University of Cluj-Napoca. 
 
Slovenia 
Jasmina Kasba, Ministry of Environment, Spatial Planning and Energy. 
Jernej Per, Slovenian Environmental Agency-EIA Department. 
 
Slovakia 
Magita Galkova,  Environmental Agency. 
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GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF THE REFERENCE ESTABLISHMENT 
1. BACKGROUND 
The industrial establishment used as the reference plant for this benchmark belongs to an 
existing international food-processing company, which produces starch, dextrose, glucose 
syrups, isosugars, alcohol, and feed products by using maize as main raw material. To provide 
with a general idea of the activity involved, the plant capacity is of about 1200 tons corn 
processing per day. The plant possesses its own wells and produces drinking and process 
water on demand (5000 m3 /day are currently in use). Most of the plant energy demand is 
provided by its own gas turbine. 
 
The reference plant makes use and produces dangerous substances exceeding the qualifying 
quantity of Column 2 of Annex I of the Seveso II Directive. This determines the automatic 
application of Art. 6 and 7 (low-tier establishment). Specifically, the involved substances are: 
liquid sulphur dioxide used for the stepping process, and ethanol produced by the company 
and stored in several locations.  
2. IMPACT AREA 
As stated in the scope description of the BEQUAR project, the environmental setting of the 
reference plant was intentionally modified to ensure anonymity. In particular the exercise was 
conducted by assuming that the reference plant was located in a completely different location 
characterised by different local vulnerability, population density and distribution, and 
different weather conditions. In this way it was possible to assure that any outcome of the 
benchmark exercise might be misinterpreted in terms of the actual risks associated with the 
territory where the reference plant is located.  
 
The hypothetical impact area is shown in figure 1. This area is an urban area very densely 
populated with flat terrain, which is located in the proximity of an Italian big city. Specific 
information on population distribution and presence was necessary for the following 
calculation of social risk information (FN-curves). 
 
The reference establishment was fictionally located in this area in proximity of and artificial 
lake and is depicted in the centre of the figure. The critical installations of the reference plant 
were marked with red triangles. 
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Figure 1: Impact Area 
3. DANGEROUS SUBSTANCES 
The reference plant employs and produces dangerous substances in a quantity that makes it 
qualify as Seveso II low tier establishment. Specifically, the maximum quantities of these 
substances present on the site are listed in table 1.  
 
Seveso II (96/82/EC) Dangerous 
Substance 
Max. 
Quantity 
(tons) 
Seveso 
Cat. Art. 6 and 7 
(column 2) 
Art. 9  (column 
3) 
Risk 
phrase 
Aggregation 
state 
Hydrochloric 
acid (32%) 
232 (mixture) 
ca. 74.2 HCl  
 
2* / / 34-37 Liquid 
Sulphur 
dioxide 60 2 50 200 23-34 Liquid 
Ammonium-
hydroxide 
(25%) 
70  
ca 17.5 NH4OH 
2* / / 34-50 Liquid 
Chlorine    (in 
vessels) 0,2 0, 2,  9i 10 25 
23-
36/37/38-
50 
Gas 
Ethanol (96%) 
 
9436 
 
7b 5.000 50.000 11 Liquid 
Oxygen 11,4 (10 m3) 0, 3 200 2000 8 Liquid 
* This substance is generally  not considered as a Seveso classified substance due to the limited content of the dangerous 
substance in the mixture (HCl 32% and Ammonia 25%) It was conservatively classified as category 2 by the operator.  
 
Table 1: List of Dangerous Substances in the Reference Plant 
 
In the table, for each substance, it was also indicated the associated risk phrase, the qualifying 
thresholds according to the Seveso Directive, and its Seveso Category as reported in the 
ClassLab Database (http://ecb.jrc.it/classification-labelling/). The specific meaning of the of 
the risk phrases and Seveso categories appearing in table 2 is illustrated in table 3.  
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Seveso Category 
0 Named substance 
1 Very Toxic 
2 Toxic 
3 Oxidising 
7b Highly Flammable Liquids (Note 3b2) 
9i Very toxic to aquatic organisms 
 
Risk Phrases 
R8: Contact with combustible material may cause fire 
R 11 Highly flammable 
R 23 Toxic by inhalation 
R 34 Causes burns 
R 37 Irritating to respiratory system 
R 36/37/38 Irritating to eyes, respiratory system and skin 
R 50 Very toxic to aquatic organisms 
 
Table 2: Risk phrases and Seveso Categories as taken from the ClassLab Database 
 
As previously stated, the presence of dangerous substances in a quantity that exceeds the 
qualifying threshold reported in column 2 of annex I of the Seveso II Directive, certainly 
qualifies the plant a Seveso lower tier establishment. The summation rule is then applied to 
determine the quantity present at the establishment and reported in tables 3 and 4, for toxics 
and flammables respectively. This calculation shows that the maximum quantity of dangerous 
substances present on the site never exceeds the upper tier threshold, which confirms the plant 
classification as a lower tier establishment.  
 
Dangerous Substance 
 Quantity  
qx/Q 
(lower tier) 
 
qx/Q 
upper tier 
 
Hydrochloric acid (32%) 232 t 74,2/50 =  1,48 74,2/200 = 0,371 
Sulphur dioxide 60 t 60/50 =  1,2 60/200 = 0,3 
Ammonium-hydroxide 
(25%) 70 t 17,5/50 =  0,35 17,5/200 = 0,085 
Sum for toxic >1 <1 
Table 3: Summation rule for toxics 
 
Dangerous Substance 
 Quantity  
qx/Q 
(lower tier) 
 
qx/Q 
upper tier 
 
Ethanol (96%) 11960 m3 9436/5000 =  1,89 negligible 
Oxygen 10 m3 11,4/200 =  0,057 negligible 
Sum for flammable >1 <1 
Table 4: Summation rule for flammables 
4. MAIN INSTALLATIONS CONSIDERED FOR THE RISK ANALYSIS 
The installations considered as more critical for their potential off-site effects and therefore to 
be submitted to complete risk analysis were identified through one of the existing screening 
methods6. The establishment was conceptually split into a number of several installations, 
considered as ‘independent’ in case of accident occurrence. An indication number was 
calculated for each independent installation, which gives a measure of its intrinsic hazard, 
which depends on (i) the amount and type of dangerous substances present, (ii) the processing 
conditions and (iii) installation location.  
 
For space reasons, the calculations are not reported in this document. However, by applying 
the criteria referred in the used guideline, amongst the several dangerous substances present 
on the site: Hydrochloric acid (32%), Ammonium hydroxide (25%) and Chlorine were not 
selected for the full QRA, whilst Sulphur Dioxide and Ethanol were considered for detailed 
                                                     
6 Guidelines for quantitative risk assessment “Purple Book” CRP 18E 
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analysis. More specifically the installations that were selected for the analysis were as 
follows: 
  
i. the tank wagon unloading station containing Sulphur Dioxide to be used for the 
stepping process, which in case of accident could lead to release of toxic substances 
in the environment (referred as N.106); 
ii. the storages of ethanol, which in case of loss of containment could lead to fire and 
explosion. (tanks 1,2,3,10: area N.33 & tanks 6,7: area N. 34). 
 
4.1 Sulphur Dioxide: unloading station (N. 106) 
The unloading station is designed to allow the operation of the sulphur dioxide unloading 
process, from one tank wagon at the time. This station is characterised by a 15 meters long 
concrete platform with mesh screen for protection. Rail barriers are also installed in the front 
and back of the tank for safety reasons. These barriers stay at a distance of ca. 10 meters from 
the tank. During the wagon moving operation and fixing, no activities are permitted and 
entrance is not allowed within the station platform. Unloading can start only when the fixing 
operation is concluded.  
 
The connection of the wagon tank to the inlet piping system of the plant is performed as 
follows: 
 
• Put on the safety belt and connect to the fall prevention. 
• Close the inlet pipe, and close the valve of the empty tank. 
• Unbuckle the unloaded pipe-stub from the empty tank. 
• Connect the inlet pipe to the unloaded pipe-stub of the full tank. 
• Open the valve of the full tank. 
• Make sure there is no any leaking. 
• Open the inlet valve to the plant. 
 
Preventing Actions 
The control of the heating process and the execution of the sulphur dioxide unloading are 
performed by of the “steeping house operator” (two times every shift). The shift leader is 
responsible for this process and for the proper use of the safety equipments. Amongst the 
several controls which are executed during the unloading process:  
 
• Visual inspection of possible SO2 leakage in the surrounding of the unloading station. 
• Proper fixing of the tank wagon. 
• Condition of the unloading pipeline. 
• Condition of the heating coil pipe. 
 
All operations are recorded in a logbook, which is filled in by the shift operator who informs 
his shift-leader in case of any anomaly. 
  
When unloading is terminated, the mechanic expert replaces the wagon tank. The steeping 
house operator has to control this activity.  
 
The weigh of present sulphur dioxide is periodically measured (once per week) and registered 
on the logbook. As the rate consumption is well known (2 tons per day) a cross check can also 
be carried out.  
 
The heating is performed by controlling the pressure. This is maintained to a fixed value of 
0.5 bar during the whole operation.  
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Sensors 
Eight sensors are used to detect possible leaks of SO2. Six sensors are positioned around the 
tank wagon and two are placed on the top of the tank. The alarm system is set at 5 ppm and at 
10 ppm and is transmitted to the control room. 
4.2 Storage of Ethanol 
The storage tanks containing ethanol, which were selected through the screening method 
mentioned in the previous section are located in the areas N. 33 and N. 34.  These tanks are 
characterised by a different capacity volume. 
  
The loading of the ethanol is continuous (12 hours) and the buffer capacity of intermediate 
storage tanks is 1 week. Automatic closure of the valve and stop of the pump is done in case 
of overflowing. 
 
All tanks are characterised by level control equipments. The tanks are also fitted by fire 
protection. There is special water-cooling system on the top of the tanks to avoid over heating 
in summertime. That system reduces the losses from the evaporation of ethanol, which could 
occur through the vent holes.  
 
All tanks are characterised by external bunds consisting of concrete walls, which are designed 
to contain all tank content in case of accidental release. 
 
As ethanol storage and handling is associated to significant fire and explosion danger, the use 
of flame and smoking is forbidden in the whole plant area. Wood and other inflammable 
material cannot be stored in the plant. 
5. HAZARD IDENTIFICATION ANALYSIS AND SCENARIOS’ IDENTIFICATION 
The Hazard Identification Analysis is a first and fundamental task within any process of risk 
analysis. This because the postulated accident Scenarios resulting from it strongly influence 
the whole risk analysis process.   
 
The Hazard Identification Analysis has been conducted through a simplified HAZOP, and 
was officially presented to the BEQUAR participant at the kick-off meeting by the 
representative of the plant operator who was in charge of managing the HAZOP process. The 
full report is given in Appendix I where the accident Scenarios are also described.  
 
The reference plant is characterised by quite simple processes and, in practice, the critical 
installations consist of storages of dangerous substances. For this reason the hazard 
identification analysis was relatively simple: standards guidewords were not used, and the 
whole set of parameters, which are typical of process operations of more complex systems, 
were not considered. Notwithstanding, the objective of the review of the hazard identification 
analysis is to assess whether all relevant accident Scenarios have been identified and properly 
described. 
 
As previously outlined, the outcome of this hazard identification review is particularly 
important for the evaluation of the following aspects of the reference plant’s risk analysis (i.e. 
frequencies and consequences) and for the estimate of area risk. However, this analysis is also 
interesting as a stand-alone process, by allowing the comparison of different approaches in 
different countries and from different perspectives, with regard to a specific application of 
hazard identification. 
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6. VISIT TO THE REFERENCE PLANT 
A walkthrough visit to the Reference Plant took place in the morning of May the 17th, 2004, 
in conjunction with the kick-off meeting.. The main objective was to show to the BEQUAR 
participants the plant installations and the safety measures, which have been put in place. The 
focus was on those installations, which were identified by the plant operator as ‘critical’, 
though the risk screening method mentioned in the previous section. More specifically, the 
visited installations were the SO2 unloading station (area 106) and the ethanol tanks (areas 33 
and 34). All the visited installations are the ones associated to the accident Scenarios 
identified through the HAZOP. 
 
The visit to the plant was also the first occasion for discussing about the identification of the 
main hazards and the postulated accident Scenarios. In particular, it took place a specific 
discussion on the HAZOP and the specific safeguards/protection measures indicated in the 
HAZOP, which were analysed by considering some schematic P&DI of the selected 
instillations. 
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REVIEW OF THE SCREENING METHOD AND OF THE HAZARD 
IDENTIFICATION ANALYSIS  
1. INTRODUCTION 
The first step of the benchmark consisted of reviewing the Hazard Identification Analysis the 
reference establishment with the intention of assessing the completeness and consistency of 
postulated accident Scenarios, the proposed protection measures and the adopted safeguards/ 
recommendations. This review was conducted by ten members of the BEQUAR group who 
played the role of an inspection authority. It is important to stress the heterogeneity of the 
BEQUAR group, consisting indeed of representatives of the Competent Authorities of the 
newly associated and candidate countries, as well as of experts of risk analysis working in 
research organisations. As a general recommendation it was advised to provide comments on 
the various aspects of the hazard identification process by using the proper experience as risk 
analyst, but also trying to provide some information on the position of the Competent 
Authorities in the proper country, with regard to the involved matters.  
 
As previously outlined, being the reference plant characterised by quite simple processes, the 
hazard identification analysis was relatively simple: standards guidewords were not used, and 
the whole set of parameters, which are typical of process operations of more complex 
systems, were not considered. Notwithstanding, the objective of the review of the hazard 
identification analysis is to assess whether all relevant accident Scenarios have been identified 
and properly described. 
 
A point to note is that outcome of this hazard identification review was particularly critical 
due to its potential effects on the following aspects of the reference plant’s risk analysis (i.e. 
frequencies and consequences) and for the estimate of area risk. However, this analysis was 
also interesting as a stand-alone process, by allowing the comparison of different approaches 
in different countries and from different perspectives, with regard to a specific application of 
hazard identification. 
2. REVIEW METHOD 
In order to guide the review process and to facilitate the inter-comparability of the results it 
was decided to organise this exercise by making use of a review template, which was 
prepared by the JRC for this specific purpose7. The review template consisted of:  
 
(i) a first section intended to allow the reviewers to perform a general assessment of 
the Hazard Identification Analysis as a whole, and  
(ii) separate sections, which where introduced in order to explore the specific aspects 
of the different Scenarios. For most of the involved topics, the basic structure of 
the template was organised in term of multiple-choice questions.  
 
This choice was driven by the necessity of setting up a system that allowed representing the 
general conclusions of the reviewers’ group as a whole and in a subjective way. Free 
comments where also allowed in order to give the reviewers the possibility complement their 
answers.  
 
Multiple-choice-questions were designed to measure the agreement of the responders about 
the involved topics. The possible choices ranged between the highest degree of agreement 
(“totally agree”) to the lowest (“totally disagree”) by passing through intermediate levels 
                                                     
7 Internal report: BEQUAR HZP RVW TMPL Rev 1.1, Technical Note, June 2004 
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(“tend to agree”and “tend to disagree”). The following scoring system was used for the 
analysis: 
 
Answer Score 
Totally agree 4 
Tend to agree 3 
Tend to disagree 2 
Totally disagree 1 
 
In order to assess the general response of the BEQUAR reviewers on the involved issues, it 
was defined a Agreement index as the average of the scores of the different responders. 
Therefore, for N responders to a specific question, the Agreement Index A was defined as 
follows: 
 
∑ == Ni isN 11 A  
 
where si is the score associated to the answer of the i-th responder. The spread of the 
responders’ answers was measured through the standard deviation of their scores i.e.: 
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3. REVIEW OF THE ‘SCREENING METHOD’ 
The first topic submitted to review was the screening method used to identify the critical 
installations to be submitted to the hazard identification analysis, and the effectiveness of its 
implementation in the case of the reference establishment.  
 
As previously mentioned, the screening method used by the reference establishment’ operator 
was the one proposed in the “Purple Book” CRP 18E guideline.  
 
In general the response of the reviewers was very positive both in terms of:  
 
• Acceptability of the method used (Q1), and  
• Effectiveness of its implementation (Q2).  
 
This response is outlined in figure 2 were the correspondent Agreement Index is depicted. 
Some criticism was raised by a responder on that fact that the methodology does not take into 
account of possible domino effects. Some doubts were also expressed with regard to the 
completeness of the list of critical installations and specifically the absence of the natural gas 
pipeline, which is missing in the report. A responder showed also some perplexities on the 
exclusion of chlorine from the list of critical installations, but such a concern was not 
explained in details. 
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Figure 2: Review of the screening method.  
 
With regard to the acceptability of the proposed methodology from a Competent Authority 
point of view, 100% of the responders gave positive answers. Some declared that no specific 
methodology is imposed in their Country, but the operator is free to use whatever 
methodology provided that its effectiveness can be demonstrated.    
4. REVIEW OF THE HAZARD IDENTIFICATION ANALYSIS  
4.1 General 
The Hazard Identification Analysis has been indicated by the operator of the reference plant 
has an HAZOP. However this HAZOP is quite atypical and several reviewers have rightly 
suggested indicating it as Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) or more generically 
Process Hazard Analysis (PHA). As a matter of fact, this Hazard Identification Study is not 
based on the analysis of how the process parameters could vary from normal operation, but on 
the failure of single components. However it was considered as totally acceptable due to the 
simplicity of the processes of the involved installations.  
 
The perception of the reviewers about the format of the Hazard Identification Analysis and 
the clearness of the assumptions made is depicted in figure 3. Even though most of the 
responders were positive on these issues, there was a disagreement of about 20%.  One of the 
main criticisms was that the explanation of the location of initiating events was not always 
completely clear. A reviewer also stated that the scope of the Hazard Identification has to be 
clearly described in the analysis, and that this aspect was missing in this case. 
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Figure 3: Review of the Hazard Identification Analysis (Format and Assumptions) 
 
With regard to the opinion of the reviewers on the completeness of the list of Scenarios, the 
quality of Scenarios’ description and risk ranking, the situation is shown in figure 4.   
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Figure 4: Review of the Hazard Identification Analysis (completeness, description, risk ranking) 
The majority of the responders gave positive answers. Some of them also emphasised that fact 
that completeness of hazards’ list is a fundamental issue, as it would clearly influence the 
whole following risk analysis study. However, it was noticed that the present study does not 
refer to other possible hazards, not specifically mentioned, which could have been screened 
out due to their low likelihood/consequence. In these situations and in order to check for 
completeness, the reviewer is often obliged to conduct his/her own hazard identification 
analysis. This is obviously not acceptable from a Competent Authorities’ perspective. 
It was mentioned the lack of a potential Scenario involving overfilling of ethanol tanks. As 
this event is not totally unlikely, some explanations should have been given. 
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It was emphasised that a clear distinction between rupture and leakage of a pipe should have 
been made. These two situations could lead to completely different Scenarios in terms of the 
consequences associated therewith.  
For risk ranking, it was suggested to extend the severity and likelihood scales, for instance 
from 1 to 10. This would avoid the quite illogical situation in which the catastrophic tank 
rupture (Scenario 1.1: S  =  4, L  =  1) and the flange leakage with unlockable wagon valve 
(Scenario  
1.5: S  =  2, L  =  2) would receive the same risk ranking and imply equal importance to risk. 
 
Acceptability of this Hazard Identification Analysis from a the Competent Authorities 
standpoint 
All the ten reviewers belonging to nine of the newly associated and candidate countries, 
declared that the present Hazard Identification Analysis would be considered as acceptable by 
the Competent Authorities in their countries. Therefore it is impossible to find any significant 
difference among the participating countries in this context.  
 
Some perplexities were raised by 2 responders only. In one case the negative response was 
due to the lack of conclusions in the hazard identification study, which are supposed to 
provide guidance for the definition of further improvement actions and the additional 
measures to be taken. It was emphasised that prevention and mitigation measures were often 
mixed up in the study and many cases not described with the proper level of detail. In the 
second case, the negative response was associated to the lack of proper consideration of 
domino effects within the HAZOP.  
 
Other General Comments 
The installations of the reference establishment are characterised by relatively simple process. 
Therefore, it is quite obvious that the hazard identification analysis conducted by the operator 
would address all major hazards. However for more complex installations, it is necessary to 
provide a more detailed and well-documented study for hazard identification. Only in this 
way the reviewer of the safety report will be able to follow all steps of the performed analysis 
and to check the assumptions and the associated limitations.   
 
The hazard identification study should provide full explanation/description of all statements 
and assumptions within described (e.g. time required to implement a mitigation action). All 
the systems having relevance for safety have to be clearly described (e.g., tank wagon heating 
system, valves, etc.). Reference the conformity of the used equipment to the actual standards 
and the safety regulations has to be present. A clear distinction between human and 
mechanical failures should be made.  
4.2 Review Scenario by Scenario 
 
Node: 1. Sulphur-dioxide tank wagon in the plant 
 
K111: Tank rupture 
 
Causes: 
1.  Mechanic impact (hydrochloric acid or alkali tank wagon, once in every 2 -3 weeks). 
Scenario K111  
54 t SO2 release to the environment as a consequence of the catastrophic rupture of the SO2 tank wagon due to 
mechanical impact with hydrochloric acid or alkali tank wagon. Tank temperature: 40 Cº; pressure: tension related 
to 40 Cº; height: 1.1 m; outflow to concrete surface, no bund. 
Risk Ranking:  
S  =  4: “Out-site large number of death”. 
L  =  1: “Not accepted to occur during facility life”. 
RR  =  4:” Small and middle out-site risk”. 
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Safeguards: None 
Recommendations: None 
 
The reviewers were asked about their perception on the completeness of causes for this event. 
As a response, 40% of the reviewers agreed that the description was satisfactory whilst 60% 
declared that some other potential causes for catastrophic rupture had not been considered.  
 
Amongst the causes not taken into account by the operator they addressed the following: 
• Design errors.  
• Corrosion or other material defect/degradation mechanisms. 
• Overpressure in the tank due to overheating. 
• External events (e.g. fire in the proximity of the tank wagon). 
 
It was also emphasised that there is a lack of description of how the mechanic impact could 
occur, whether any protection measure is in place or not.  
 
With regard to K111 Scenario, the majority of reviewers (70%) declared that despite the very 
low likelihood, this Scenario should be considered as credible and needs to be taken into 
account in the risk analysis. In addition, regardless of its credibility 80% of the reviewers 
stated that this Scenario would be required by the Competent Authorities in their country 
anyhow, and it would be considered as the worst-case Scenario. 
 
All reviewers agreed with the ranking given by the operator (with one exception in which the 
responder proposed a higher likelihood without clear explanation i.e. L = 3). 
 
As the operator did not mention any safeguards and recommendations, the reviewers were 
also asked to suggest any other safeguards or protection measures they would consider as 
appropriate. 60% of the reviewers provided with some recommendations, which are 
summarised below: 
 
• In order to prevent the spread of liquid in case of tank rupture, a specific bund/fence 
should be put in place.  
• Water sprays should be set in order to abate SO2 vapours in case of tank rupture. 
• The use of certified wagons is recommended.  
• Rail barriers should be mentioned explicitly in the hazard identification analysis. 
• The existence of specific operation instructions, training and maintenance should be 
mentioned explicitly in the hazard identification analysis. 
• Specific means of protection for the operators should be clearly specified. 
• Internal transport code of conduct has to be set. 
• In case of accident, a specific attention should be paid to ethanol storage tank n.3 that 
is located nearby. As a matter of fact, SO2 has explosive properties when in contact 
with ethanol.  
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K121: Isolable SO2 leakage on the pipe, before the pipe failure protector valve 
 
Causes 
1. Flange leakage. 
Scenario K121  
Isolable leakage of equivalent ø10 mm due to failure of the flange; horizontal outflow 
during 20 minutes (when SO2 sensors are available) or during 30 minutes* (when SO2 
sensors are not available); height: 5 m; pressure: tension related to 40 Cº. 
* 10 minutes for diagnosis and then 20 minutes for action. 
Risk Ranking 
S = 1: “In-site health injury or health impacts”. 
L = 3: “Could occur several times during facility life”. 
RR = 3: “Small and middle out-site risk”. 
Safeguards 
8 SO2 sensors, 5 ppm sensitivity 
Operation permanently attended by the operator, who is able to detect the leakage 
after 10 minutes from the release.  
Recommendations 
None. 
 
 
For K121 Scenario and with reference to the clearness of the Scenario description and the 
acceptability of the hypothesis made, the Agreement Index was quite high: 3.4 (σ  = 0.516) 
and 3.5 (σ  = 0.527), respectively. In both cases all the reviewers replied either “totally 
agree” or “tend to agree”. 
 
Amongst the most relevant comments: 
 
• Causes have to be more specific (e.g., “flange leakage due to …”) 
• The estimated amount of released SO2 should appear in the hazard identification 
study 
• The release time should be better explained and justified. As a matter of fact the time 
considered for operator’s response seems to be quite optimistic and should be 
justified. 
• A clear distinction should be made between leakage and rupture. This would lead to 
quite different consequences. 
 
With regard to risk ranking, the totality of the reviewers agreed with the choice made by the 
operator. Someone observed only that in case of rupture the ranking should be revised, and 
additional safety measures should be taken.  
 
For safeguards, the majority of responders declared that they are described correctly 
(Agreement index = 3.111, s  = 0.601, 10%: no opinion), however some reviewers underlined 
that the issues described (sensors, presence of operators) are more mitigation measures than 
safeguards. For this reason they stated that the operator should be encouraged to identify also 
measures to prevent Scenario from happening. It was also suggested to describe how to stop 
tank heating is case of release. 
 
As the operator did not mention any recommendation, the reviewers were also asked to 
provide with some suggestions. Some of them suggested the use of an additional safety 
system, consisting of an automatic shut-off valve, activated by the SO2 sensors. A proper 
monitoring and inspection plan should further reduce the likelihood of occurrence of this 
event. 
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K131 Isolable SO2 leakage on the flexible pipe 
 
 
Causes 
1. Flexible pipe-end rupture AND failure of the pipe rupture protection-valve. 
Scenario K131 
Isolable leakage due to flexible pipe rupture AND failure of the protection valve 
(spring valve); vertical outflow from ø25 mm during 20 minutes (when SO2 sensors 
are available) or during 30 minutes* (when SO2 sensors are not available);  
height: 5 m; pressure: tension related to 40 Cº. 
 
* 10 minutes for diagnosis and then 20 minutes for action. 
Risk Ranking 
S = 1: “In-site health injury or health impacts”. 
L = 3: “Could occur several times during facility life”. 
RR = 3:” Small and middle out-site risk” 
Safeguards 
8 SO2 sensors, 5 ppm sensitivity. 
Operation permanently attended by the operator, who is able to detect the leakage 
after 10 minutes from the release. 
Recommendations 
None  
 
For K131 Scenario and with reference to the clearness of the Scenario description and the 
acceptability of the hypothesis made, the Agreement Index was quite high: 3.4 (σ  = 0.516) 
and 3.2 (σ  = 0.412), respectively. In both cases all the reviewers replied either “totally 
agree” or “tend to agree”. 
 
The main comments were similar to the previous case: 
 
• The amount of released SO2 should appear in the hazard identification study. 
• The release time should be better explained and justified. As a matter of fact the time 
considered for operator’s response seems to be quite optimistic and should be 
justified. 
 
For to risk ranking, the totality of the reviewers agreed with the choice made by the operator. 
 
With regard to safeguards, the majority of responders declared that they are described 
correctly (Agreement index = 3.111, s  = 0.702), however also in this case, some reviewers 
underlined that the issues described (sensors, presence of operators) are more mitigation 
measures than safeguards. For this reason they stated that the operator should be encouraged 
to identify also measures to prevent Scenario from happening.  
 
As a recommendation, some of the reviewers suggested the use of automatic systems to stop 
the flux of SO2 driven by the sensors, and the setting of a proper monitoring and inspection 
plan. 
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Isolable SO2 leakage before the starch industry on the pipe bridge 
 
Causes 
1. Pipe rupture on the pipe bridge AND failure of the pipe failure protection valve (spring valve) AND failure of the 
drain valve (valve after flexible pipe and before pipe bridge). 
Scenario  
None. 
 
Risk Ranking 
S = 1: “In-site health injury or health impacts”. 
L = 2: “Could occur once during facility life”. 
RR = 2: “In-site risk”. 
Safeguards 
Operation permanently attended by the operator, who is able to detect the leakage after 10 minutes from the release. 
Recommendations 
None. 
 
For this event that does not lead to a Scenario, the reviewers were asked whether they agreed 
on this statement. The Agreement Index was 2.889 (σ =0.782), with 10% of responders who 
declared of not having a specific opinion. Somebody also suggested that causes should be 
more specific, by explaining why and under which conditions the components may fail.  
 
For risk ranking, all the reviewers agreed with the choice made by the operator. 
 
For safeguards, the Agreement Index was 3.333 (σ = 0.866), with 10% of the responders who 
declared of not having a specific opinion. 
 
Also for this case it was suggested to make a clear distinction between leakage and rupture of 
the pipe, because this could lead to different Scenarios. 
 
K151 Not isolable SO2 leakage on the pipe, before the pipe failure protector valve 
 
Causes 
1. Flange leakage AND failure of the tank wagon valve. 
Scenario K151  
Not Isolable leakage of equivalent ø10 mm due to failure of the flange AND the 
tank wagon valve; horizontal outflow during 20 minutes (when SO2 sensors are 
available) or during 30 minutes* (when SO2 sensors are not available); afterwards, 
vertical outflow from ø40 mm for 10 minutes (time required for mounting the shut-
off valve);  
height: 5 m; pressure: tension related to 40 Cº. 
 * 10 minutes for diagnosis and then 20 minutes for action. 
Risk Ranking 
S = 2: “In-site personal accidents or severe injury”. 
L = 2: “Could occur once during facility life”. 
RR = 4: “ 
 
Small and middle out-site risk”. 
Safeguards 
8 SO2 sensors, 5 ppm sensitivity 
Operation permanently attended by the operator, who is able to detect the leakage 
after 10 minutes from the release. 
Recommendations 
1. Stopping the leakage is recommended, by mounting a flanged shutoff valve. 
 
 
 
 
For K151 Scenario and with reference to the clearness of the Scenario description and the 
acceptability of the hypothesis made, the Agreement Index was 3.2 in both cases (with σ  = 
0.789and σ  = 0.422, respectively). With regard to clearness, the higher spread of data (σ  = 
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0.789) was also due to the higher number of responders (20%) who declared: “tend to 
disagree”.  The main criticism was due to the lack of information on the quantity of the 
released substance, the outflow mechanism, and the justification about the time required 
executing the mitigation measure. 
 
For risk ranking, all the reviewers agreed with the choice made by the operator. 
 
With regard to safeguards, the Agreement index was 3.2 (σ  = 0.422), and also in this case, 
similar comments have been given (the proposed safeguards are mitigation actions, only). 
 
For recommendations, almost the totality of the responders did agree with the operator. 
However it was questioned that mounting of a shut-off valve of a wagon in such  a short time 
given any weather, visibility and accessibility conditions (due to leakage around) could be 
justified only if the operators has proved experience and training.  
 
K116 Not Isolable SO2 leakage on the flexible pipe 
 
Causes 
1. Flange leakage AND failure of the pipe rupture protection valve AND failure of 
the tank wagon valve. 
Scenario K161  
Not Isolable leakage due to flexible pipe rupture AND failure of the protection 
valve (spring valve) AND failure of tank wagon valve; vertical outflow from ø25 
mm (when SO2 sensors are available) or during 30 minutes* (when SO2 sensors are 
not available); afterwards vertical outflow from ø40 mm during 10 minutes (time 
required for mounting the shut-off valve); 
height: 5 m; pressure: tension related to 40 Cº. 
  
* 10 minutes for diagnosis and then 20 minutes for action. 
Risk Ranking 
S = 2: “In-site personal accidents or severe injury”. 
L = 2: “Could occur once during facility life”. 
RR = 4: “Small and middle out-site risk”. 
Safeguards 
8 SO2 sensors, 5 ppm sensitivity. 
Operation permanently attended by the operator, who is able to detect the leakage 
after 10 minutes from the release. 
Recommendations 
1. Stopping the leakage is recommended, by mounting a flanged shutoff valve. 
 
 
For K161 Scenario and with reference to the clearness of the Scenario description and the 
acceptability of the hypothesis made, the Agreement Index was 3.222 (σ=0.441) and 3.111  
(σ  = 0.333), respectively), where all the reviewers declared “totally agree” and “tend to 
agree” (with 10% of “no opinion” in both cases). 
 
For risk ranking, all the reviewers agreed with the choice made by the operator. 
 
With regard to safeguards, the Agreement index was 3.222 (σ  = 0.667), and also in this case, 
similar comments have been given (the proposed safeguards are mitigation actions, only)  
 
For recommendations, 70% of responders declared to agree with the operator whilst 30% 
stated of not having a specific opinion. 
 
Not Isolable SO2 leakage before the starch industry on the pipe bridge 
 
Causes 
1. Flexible pipe-end rupture AND failure of the pip failure protection valve AND failure of the tank wagon valve 
AND failure of the drain valve. 
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Scenario  
None. 
 
Risk Ranking 
S = 2: “In-site personal accidents or severe injury”. 
L = 1: “Not accepted to occur during facility life”. 
RR = 2: “In-site risk”. 
Safeguards 
8 SO2 sensors, 5 ppm sensitivity. 
Operation permanently attended by the operator, who is able to detect the leakage after 10 minutes from the release. 
Recommendations 
1. Stopping the leakage is recommended, by mounting a flanged shutoff valve. 
 
For this event that does not lead to a Scenario, the reviewers were asked whether they agreed 
on this statement. The Agreement Index was 3.000 (σ =1.000), with a large number of 
responders who declared of not having a specific opinion (30%). Somebody also suggested 
that causes should be more specific, by explaining why and under which conditions the 
components may fail. 
 
For risk ranking 70% of the reviewers agreed with the choice made by the operator, 10% 
declared of not having a specific opinion, whilst the 20% scored slightly higher values of 
likelihood and severity. 
 
For safeguards the Agreement Index was 3.250 (σ = 0.707), with 20% of the responders who 
declared of not having a specific opinion. 
 
Finally 80% of the reviewers declared that the recommendation proposed by the operator is 
acceptable. 
 
Overpressure in the tank wagon 
 
Causes 
1. Weather conditions and tank overheat 
Scenario  
None. 
 
Risk Ranking 
S = 1: “In-site health injury or health impacts”. 
L = 2: “Could occur once during facility life”. 
RR = 2: “In-site risk”. 
Safeguards 
1.1. Pressure- release valve. 
Recommendations 
None. 
 
For this event that does not lead to a Scenario, the reviewers were asked whether they agreed 
on this statement. The Agreement Index was the lowest if compared to all previous questions, 
being 2.571 (σ =1.134). 20% of the responders declared of not having a specific opinion on 
this matter, and 20% declared to “totally disagree” with the sentence. The main reason for 
this was the fact that the tank wagon stands for ca. a month in the due unloading location that 
is a relatively long time, and the heating system used to “pump” the SO2 in the pipeline is not 
clearly described. Besides, no information is given about the availability of a cooling system. 
 
For risk ranking, all the reviewers agreed with the choice made by the operator that is quite in 
contradiction with the previous response. 
 
Risk ranking 70% of the reviewers, agreed with the operator, 10% declared of not having a 
specific opinion on this matter, whilst 20% expressed they disagreement but with different 
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opinions on the likelihood of occurrence of this accidental event (higher and lower than the 
given value, respectively). 
 
For safeguards, the Agreement index was 3.000 (σ  = 0.816), and also in this case, similar 
comments have been given (the proposed safeguards are mitigation actions, only). Finally, 
60% of responders proposed additional recommendations, which included: the possible use 
of wall protection, and the installation of temperature/pressure sensors for monitoring 
operation in the case of overheating. Cooling down measures and should be put in place. 
 
Node 2:  Sulphur-dioxide wagon change 
 
K211: Tank rupture 
 
Causes 
1. Mechanic impact  
Scenario K211  
54 t SO2 release to the environment as a consequence of the catastrophic rupture of the SO2 tank wagon due to 
mechanical impact during wagon change. 
Tank temperature: 40 Cº; pressure: tension related to 40 Cº; height: 1.1 m; outflow to concrete surface, no bund. 
 
Risk Ranking 
S = 4: “Out-site large number of death”. 
L = 1: “Not accepted to occur during facility life”. 
RR = 4:” Small and middle out-site risk”. 
Safeguards 
1.1. Rail barriers and clearance protection. 
Recommendations 
1. It is recommended not to rack hydrochloric acid or alkali during wagon changing. 
 
With regard to the K211 Scenario, there was a better balance between the reviewers who 
declared that this Scenario is credible and those who declared that it is too conservative 
(50%). However, regardless of its credibility 90% of the reviewers stated that this Scenario 
would be required anyhow by the Competent Authorities in their country, and it would be 
considered as the worst-case Scenario. It was also emphasised that despite the different cause, 
this Scenario has to be analysed together with K111 by listing all possible causes of impact. 
Again it was suggested to include material degradation mechanisms and possible fires in the 
proximity of the tank wagon as other possible causes of catastrophic rupture. 
 
All reviewers agreed with the ranking given by the operator. 
 
For safeguards, the Agreement Index regarding their acceptability was 3.200 (σ = 0.632), and 
some of the reviewers suggested to consider the possibility to include: (i) special bund to limit 
the spread of the liquid in case of rupture, (ii) the installation of water sprays for vapours’ 
abating and (iii) indication for individual protection measures. 70% of the reviewers 
considered acceptable the recommendation proposed by the operator, and also for this case it 
was suggested to take specific measures to limit the consequences to ethanol storage 3 in case 
of accident. It was also recommended to explicitly mention that no activity should be allowed 
during tank wagon change.  
 
K221: Not isolable SO2 release before the shut-off valve line 
 
Causes 
1. 1 Flange or connecting fails AND failure of the tank wagon valve. 
Scenario K221  
Not Isolable leakage of due to failure of flange connection AND failure of tank wagon valve; vertical outflow from 
ø40 mm during 10 minutes (time required for mounting the shut-off valve);. 
Height: 5 m; pressure: pressure: tension related to 40 Cº. 
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Risk Ranking 
S = 2: “In-site personal accidents or severe injury”. 
L = 2: “Could occur once during facility life”. 
RR = 4:” Small and middle out-site risk”. 
Safeguards 
1.1. Two people are attending the process operation. They mount a flanged shut-off valve in 10 minutes in case of 
leakage. 
Recommendations 
1. The soonest intervention to stop the flow, by the locker armature, what is kept at the crew. 
 
For Scenario K221 and with reference to the clearness of the Scenario description and the 
acceptability of the hypothesis made, the Agreement Index was: 3.333 (σ = 0.707, no opinion: 
10%) and 3.444 (σ  = 0.726), respectively.  
 
For risk ranking, 80% of the reviewers agreed with the choice made by the operator, whilst 
the rest suggested a higher value for likelihood of occurrence (L = 3).   
 
For safeguards, an Agreement Index of 3.333 (σ = 0.866, no opinion 10%) was the global 
response of reviewers, but 20% of the responders who tended to disagree regarding the 
clearness o their description, expressed some doubts on the response time of the operators and 
declared a better explanation of this issue should be given. Besides, also in this case there is 
no reference to preventive measures. Finally, 70% of the reviewers agreed on the proposed 
recommendations, whilst 10% declared not having an opinion. 
 
Node 1&2: Ethanol Tanks ( 1-2-3-10 & 6-7) 
 
A1x_y8  Catastrophic rupture 
 
Causes 
1. Material defect. 
2. Pipe branch rupture on a not isolatable section. 
Scenarios:  1st type :  A11_1 – A11_2 – A11_3 – A11_10 – A11_6 – A11_7 
                   2nd type:  A12_1 – A12_2 – A12_3 – A12_10 – A12_6 – A12_7  
 
1st type. 
5000, 2000, 930, 230, 700, 700 m3 ethanol release to the environment due to catastrophic rupture of the tank. 
Temperature: environmental; pressure: atmospheric. 
Bunds are respectively: 1500, 817, 900, 100, 113, 113 m2, which correspond to the following volume containments: 
4000, 1939, 930, 231, 700, 700 m3. 
 
2nd type.  
5000, 2000, 930, 230, 700, 700 m3 ethanol release to the environment due to not isolable pipe rupture (ø80 mm); 
Temperature: environmental; pressure: atmospheric. 
Discharge velocity depends on the hydrostatic head. Liquid levels are respectively: 13.2, 10, 4.6, 9.3, 8.9, 8.9 m.  
Bunds are respectively: 1500, 817, 900, 100, 113, 113 m2, which correspond to the following volume containments: 
4000, 1939, 930, 231, 700, 700 m3.  
Risk Ranking 
S = 4: “Out-site large number of death”. 
L = 1: “Not accepted to occur during facility life”. 
RR = 4:” Small and middle out-site risk”. 
Safeguards 
Bunds are designed to contain all tank content 
Bunds are designed to contain all tank content 
Recommendations 
Installation of alcohol detectors, which are set to very high sensitivity.  
 
                                                     
8 x = 1,2 (1 = Node 1; 2 = Node 2); y: tank number 
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The list of above Scenarios refers to the ethanol tanks. As the only difference amongst them is 
the volume and the location, they have been all treated together. 
 
80% of the reviewers agreed that the operator has identified all significant causes. Those, 
who disagreed, declared that other elements have to be considered, as for instance: thermal 
stress and mechanical impacts. It was also emphasised that more detail should be given to the 
type and extent of possible defects or degradation mechanisms. 
Regarding the credibility of the Scenario, a relatively balanced situation was observed. 
Indeed, 60% of the reviewers stated that these Scenarios are credible whilst 40% declared that 
they are too conservative. However, regardless of their credibility 80% of the reviewers stated 
that these Scenarios would be required by the Competent Authorities in their country anyhow, 
and they would be considered as  worst-case (10% expressed no opinion). 
 
All reviewers agreed with the ranking given by the operator. 
 
For safeguards, the Agreement Index regarding their acceptability was 3.111 (σ = 0.782, 10% 
“no opinion”), and some of the reviewers suggested to include information on how to remove 
the ethanol from the second containment in case of release. Again it was mentioned that there 
are no protection measures. 80% of the reviewers declared that the recommendation is 
acceptable, and it was mentioned that the installation of detectors requires a detailed analysis 
of the dispersion characteristics. 
 
 Overpressure in the tanks 
 
Causes 
1. Vacuum/pressure safety valve 
Scenario  
None. 
Risk Ranking 
S = 2: “In-site health injury or health impacts”. 
L = 1: “Not accepted to occur during facility life.” 
RR = 2: “In-site risk”. 
Safeguards 
Resistance of the tank wall and presence of the outside bund. 
Recommendations 
None. 
 
For this event that does not lead to a Scenario, the reviewers were asked whether they agreed 
on this statement. The Agreement Index was quite low if compared to the previous cases 
2.286 (σ=1.113), with a large number of responders who declared of not having a specific 
opinion (30%) and a relatively high number of responders who disagreed (40%). Due to the 
possible severity of the consequences it was also suggested to conduct a detailed analysis on 
the occurrence frequency of such an event. In addition it was highlighted that (i) 
vacuum/pressure safety valves may be blocked and (ii) overheating can occur, and (iii) 
overfilling due to failure of the level sensors may be an issue. Finally, from the description it 
is not perfectly clear whether this event includes also the vacuum case, which could also lead 
to a release due to tank failure.                        
 
For risk ranking 80% of the reviewers agreed with the choice made by the operator, 10% 
declared of not having a specific opinion, whilst the 10% scored a lower severity (S = 1). 
 
For safeguards the Agreement Index was 3.286 (σ = 0.756), with a quite high number of 
responders who declared of not having a specific opinion (30%). 
 
Finally 40% of the reviewers provided with other elements to be considered as possible 
recommendations: 
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• Definition of proper inspection plans for the tanks and pipeworks.  
• Inclusion of additional safety pressure valve.  
• Remote-control switch for cooling the system. 
 
Pressure decrease during unloading 
 
Causes 
1. Loss of power supply. 
Scenario  
None. 
Risk Ranking 
S = 1: “In-site health injury or health impacts”. 
L = 1: “Not accepted to occur during facility life”. 
RR = 1: “In-site risk”. 
Safeguards 
None. 
Recommendations 
None. 
 
For this event that does not lead to a Scenario, the reviewers were asked whether they agreed 
on this statement. The Agreement Index was 3.000 (σ =1.069), with 20% of responders who 
declared of not having a specific opinion and a 20% of responders who disagreed.  The main 
criticism was that loss of power cannot influence pressure decrease during unloading. 
 
For risk ranking 70% of the reviewers agreed with the choice made by the operator, 10% 
declared of not having a specific opinion, whilst the 20% scored a higher value of the 
likelihood. This because loss of power supply should be considered as relatively frequent 
event, and unless emergency power source is available, likelihood of power failure should not 
be rated lower than  L = 3.  
 
For this event, the reviewers did not suggest any significant safeguard or recommendation. 
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Rupture of the pipe next to the tanks 
  
Causes 
1. External mechanic impact (tree, truck, etc). 
Scenario  
None. 
 
Risk Ranking 
S = 1: “In-site health injury or health impacts”. 
L = 1: “Not accepted to occur during facility life”. 
RR = 1: “In-site risk”. 
Safeguards 
None. 
Recommendations 
None. 
 
For this event that does not lead to a Scenario, the reviewers were asked whether they agreed 
on this statement. The Agreement Index was the lowest of this review 2.750 (σ =1.035), with 
20% of responders who declared of not having a specific opinion and a 40% of responders 
who disagreed (40%).  The main criticism was that pipeworks are very sensitive to release. 
 
For risk ranking all reviewers agreed with the choice made by the operator. 
  
For this event, the reviewers did not suggest any significant safeguard or recommendation. 
5. SUMMARY OF THE HAZARD IDENTIFICATION ANALYSIS REVIEW  
This section summarises the outcome of the review of the BEQUAR members of the Hazard 
Identification Analysis conducted by the Reference Establishment’s operator. More 
specifically, it represents a digest, of the BEQUAR reviewers’ position with regard to the 
appropriateness of the identified Scenarios, their description and the proposed safeguards. A 
point to note is that the representation of the group position as a whole required some 
simplifications. The results presented represent, therefore, general trends and have not 
statistical significance. 
 
In general, the proposed Hazard Identification Analysis was considered acceptable by the 
BEQUAR reviewers. The only two exceptions were augmented by the lack of proper 
conclusions to guide for possible improvement and mitigation actions and for the lack of 
consideration of domino effects. 
 
Particularly interesting is the comparison of the reviewers’ position on the most catastrophic 
Scenarios (figure 5 and 6). More specifically, figure 5 gives the percentage of reviewers 
considering the mentioned Scenarios are credible (blue bar) or too conservative (purple bar). 
The most credible Scenario resulted: the catastrophic rupture of the SO2 tank wagon as a 
consequence of the impact with the alkali/chlorine tank wagon (K111), whilst the catastrophic 
rupture of ethanol tanks (A11) was considered the less credible. Perfect balance (50%) was 
found for the catastrophic rupture of the SO2 tank wagon during wagon change (K211). 
 
Figure 5 summarises the results on the question whether the Competent Authorities of the 
reviewers’ countries would require a detailed analysis of these Scenarios anyhow and 
regardless of their credibility. In all these cases, a common positive response was noticed, by 
demonstrating that high consequence/low probability Scenarios are always taken in great 
consideration by the Competent Authorities. 
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Figure 5: Credibility of catastrophic Scenarios  
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Figure 6: Requirement by the CAs of the catastrophic Scenarios 
 
For the other Scenarios, the Agreement Indexes and the standard deviations, which give a 
measure of the responses’ scatter, are depicted in Figures 7 and 8.  The values reported refer 
to the perception of the reviewers with regard to the description of the Scenario itself (blue 
bar), the acceptability of hypotheses made (purple bar) and the description of safeguards 
(yellow bar).  
 
For all Scenarios the Agreement Indexes were quite high by exceeding the value of 3.  A 
greater consensus was found on the Scenario formulation then the description of safeguards. 
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Figure 7: Agreement indexes vs. Scenario  
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Figure 8: Spread of reviewers’ response vs. Scenario 
For the events that did not lead to accidental Scenarios, the agreement index is reported in 
figure 9. In this case the level of agreement was definitely lower if compared to the previous 
case, with a higher indecision level (from 10 to 30% of “no opinion”). The spread of 
responses is depicted in Figure 10. Particularly interesting is the case of tank overpressure 
both for SO2 (K118) and A12 (Ethanol). These scored considerably less, which means that not 
all BEQUAR responders agreed on the fact that these events should be excluded from the 
detailed analysis. 
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Figure 9: Events that do not lead to a Scenario 
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Figure 10: Spread of reviewers’ response vs. Scenario 
 
  Page 35 
Final Report    
REVIEW OF THE FREQUENCY DATA 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The present chapters summarises the main conclusions of the review on the reference 
establishment frequency data, which was conducted by nine members of BEQUAR. As usual, 
the data referred to the accident Scenarios postulated through the Hazard Identification 
Analysis.  
 
The accident frequency data related to the reference plant, which were submitted to review, 
were provided by the JRC who played the role of the operator for this exercise. These were 
elaborated by modifying some of the original data, assumptions and calculations as provided 
by the actual operator of the reference plant. The difference from the original data set makes 
this frequency data review totally uncorrelated from the actual case. For this reason, it is 
possible to assert unambiguously the non addressability of the conclusions of this study to the 
actual plant used as the reference plant. 
 
The data provided by the reviewers were compared to the reference values through graphics 
as shown in the following sections. In order to maintain anonymity, it was decided to indicate 
each responder through an integer number without quoting their name and affiliation. 
 
Several sources were quoted by the reviewers which were used for their 
analysis9, , , , , , , , ,10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 . 
 
In several cases it was stressed that human factors related events are always very difficult to 
be assessed because they depend on several factors as for instance: (i) the specific instructions 
and procedures which are available and used in the plant and (ii) the specific safety culture 
within the organisation involved. 
 
A point to note is that frequency assessment is a quite delicate task in any Quantitative Risk 
Assessment process. This because of the uncertainty associated to the data and the related 
effect on the final outcome of the overall risk analysis. For this reason, a fundamental step in 
the benchmark is to get a feedback from the BEQUAR reviewers about their perception on 
the frequency values given and the general difficulties associated to this process. 
 
2. SUMMARY OF FREQUENCY DATA 
The present section summarises the results of the accident frequency analysis of the reference 
establishment. As stated in the introduction,  the original data provided by the operator were 
taken as a basis for this analysis. However, some of the original data, assumptions and 
calculation methods have been slightly modified by the JRC in order to differentiate the 
benchmark from the actual case. In this way it was possible to produce a consistent data set 
that differs from the original case and, therefore, that can be object of review without restrain. 
                                                     
9 "Red Book" - CPR12E “Methods for Determining and Processing Probabilities” 
10 Guidelines for Process Equipment Reliability Data, 1989 Center for Chemical Process Safety/AIChE 
11 Jefferson Lab Environment, Health & Safety (EH&S) Manual , Appendix 6500-T1 ODH 
12 WASH 1400 (The Rasmussen Report), Nuclear Regulatory Commission 1975 
13 Smith, DJ, “Reliability and Maintainability in Perspective”, 2nd. and 3rd. editions, Macmillan,. London, 1985 
14 Swierk “Development of the generic reliability database for chemical installations elements”, 1999 (in Polish) 
15 Batstone, R.J., Tomi, D.T., “Hazard Analysis in Planning Industrial Developments”, Loss Prevention, 13, 7, 
1980 
16 Internal databases based on expert judgment &databases commonly used for nuclear installations 
17 http://www.roymech.co.uk/index3.htm 
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By following this approach any misinterpretation of the data and any possible disagreement 
on the methods used to calculate the frequencies of the top events, will not be addressable to 
the real situation with regards to the reference plant.  
 
1. The system “sulphur-dioxide” has been modelled considering two main phases: 
 
• All actions necessary to start the mission (i.e. arrival of tank wagon + its connection 
to the plant); no mission time can be considered as all events are human actions 
(involved Scenarios: K111, K211, K221). In these cases the probability of release (Q) 
is based on human error probabilities. Then Q is multiplied by the frequency of tank 
arrivals fA (n. tanks/year). Therefore the annual frequency of release of toxic gas fR1 is 
given by: fR1  =  fA Q release/year  =  (n. tanks/year) (release/tank). 
 
• The tank wagon is on line.  At t = 0 all components are working (a check of them is 
carried out before starting the discharging operations; if a component is found to be 
failed the mission is delayed until the repair is completed) and the discharging 
process lasts 876 hours (mission time). There are 10 missions/year (involved 
Scenarios: K121, K131, K151, K161). In all of these Scenarios we determine the 
Expected Number of Failures (W) for a mission of 876 h, i.e. the time needed to 
discharge of the content of the tank wagon into the plant (release/mission). Then we 
multiply this value by the number of missions in a year f (mission/year). The annual 
frequency of release of toxic gas fR2 is, therefore, given by: fR2  =  f W Release/year  =  
(n. missions/year) (release/mission). 
 
2. Different considerations were made for the “Ethanol” system, for which no Scenario 
analysis has been performed. 
 
The hypothesis adopted during the study (for all Scenarios) is that the operator always 
intervenes in case of accident (there are no events on the type “the operator does not 
intervene”). 
 
The following table summarises the data used in the frequency analysis, which was described 
in an internal report18: 
 
                                                     
18 Internal report: BEQUAR FRQ Data Rev 2.0, Technical Note, November 2004 
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Event q f (y-1) failure rate (h-1)
repair time 
(h)
Mission time 
(h)
SENSERR Sensor system doesn't warn the SO2 leakage 9.187E-05
6.800E-07
9.119E-05
5.280E-08
7.195E-04
SENS_SUPPL Error of the supply of sensor system 1.700E-07 4.000E+00 8.760E+02
SENS_CU Error of central unit 3.800E-06 2.400E+01 8.760E+02
CABLE Cable error between sensor #X and central unit 2.200E-09 2.400E+01 8.760E+02
SENSOR Error of sensor # X 1.500E-05 4.800E+01 8.760E+02
K111_DEC Driver decelerates too late 1.000E-03 n.a. n.a. n.a.
K111_SL - K211_SL Exceeding the shunting speed limit (operator fault) 1.000E-05 n.a. n.a. n.a.
K121_FL - K151_FL Flange leakage 4.000E-07 n.a. 8.760E+02
K131_PV - 
K161 PV Failure of the piperupture protector-valve 2.170E-05 n.a. 8.760E+02
K131_FLEX Flexible pipe rupture 3.400E-09 n.a. 8.700E+02
K161_FLEX Flexible pipe rupture 3.400E-09 n.a. 8.760E+03
3.503E-04
1.883E-02
2.958E-06
2.978E-05
K151_WV - 
K161_WV  
K221 WV
Wagon valve is unlockable 4.200E-03 n.a. n.a. n.a.
K211_BAR Operator fault: barrier remains open 3.000E-02 n.a. n.a. n.a.
K211_OUT Fault in sequence of operation: wagon wasn't pulled out of tank 3.000E-05 n.a. n.a. n.a.
K221_AF SO2 release, because of adjustenent error 1.000E-05 n.a. n.a. n.a.
K221_GF SO2 flange leakage because gasket not checked 1.000E-05 n.a. n.a. n.a.
 
Table 5: Frequency data of the initiating events (n.a. = not applicable) 
 
The outcome of the analysis led to the following values of the top events’ frequency, which 
were used for the risk analysis:  
Top Event Q/
1.001E-08
1.000E-08
9.000E-12
8.400E-08
W f(y-1)
SENSERR
K111 2.600E-07
K211  9.000E-11
K221 8.400E-07
k121_1 3.503E-04 3.503E-03
k121_2 3.219E-08 3.219E-07
k131_1 5.569E-08 5.569E-07
k131_2 5.117E-12 5.117E-11
k151_1 1.471E-06 1.471E-05
k151_2 1.352E-10 1.352E-09
k161_1 2.355E-09 2.355E-08
k161_2 2.164E-13 2.164E-12
A11 5.400E-06
A12 3.000E-07  
 
Table 6: Frequency data of the top events 
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3. REVIEW OF FREQUENCY DATA SCENARIO BY SCENARIO 
3.1 SO2 related Scenarios 
Scenario K111 
54 t SO2 release to the environment as a consequence of the catastrophic rupture of the SO2 tank wagon due to 
mechanical impact with hydrochloric acid or alkali tank wagon. 
 
The present Scenario is caused by human factors related events, for which the likelihood of 
occurrence is expressed through a probability (q) instead of a frequency. This Scenario is 
described by the fault-tree shown below: 
 
 
The reference values for initiating 
events’ probability of occurrence where 
provided to the BEQUAR members for 
review. The results of this review are 
represented in figures 11 and 12, for the 
events K111_DEC and K111_SL 
respectively. These figures show the 
values as perceived by the different 
partners for the involved initiating 
events, which are compared to the 
reference value (bar on the graph). 
Impact of tanks 
 
Top: K111 
Exceeding the 
shunting speed 
limit 
Driver 
decelerates too 
late 
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Figure 11: Likelihood of occurrence (per mission) of the K111_DEC event as perceived by the 
BEQUAR members. The bars on the graph represent the distance from the reference value 
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Figure 12: Likelihood of occurrence (per mission) of the K111_SL event as perceived by the BEQUAR 
members. The bars on the graph represent the distance from the reference value 
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In order to give a general trend of the BEQUAR group as a whole, it was decided to provide a 
figure representing a sort of ‘average’ response through the median and the range of the 
values proposed. Table 1.1 provides a comparison of these values with the values taken as the 
reference and submitted for review. 
 
  Event Description Type q(ref) q(median) q(range) 
K111_DEC Driver decelerates too late  Basic 1.0E-03 1.0E-03 4.0E-04 -1.0E-03   
K111_SL Exceeding the shunting speed limit (operator fault) Basic 1.0E-05 1.0E-03 1.0E-04 -5.0E-03  
Table 7 
As it results from both the figures and the table, the value for the initiating event associated to 
the late deceleration of the driver was considered as appropriate by all the reviewers. On the 
contrary the likelihood of exceeding the speed limit was considered too low. In particular the 
general response of the reviewers was homogeneous by suggesting a higher value for the 
likelihood of occurrence (ca. 2 orders of magnitude on the average). This was mainly 
explained by the fact that also this event is human factor related and there is no special reason 
to distinguish from the previous case.  
 
The annual frequency of the K111 top event resulting from the above values and assuming 
26 missions per year is given in figure 1.3. This consists of the catastrophic rupture of the SO2 
tank wagon as a consequence of the impact with the alkali/chlorine.  
 
 
Figure 13: frequency of the top event as perceived by the BEQUAR members. The bars on the graph 
represent the distance from the reference value 
 
In general the values perceived by the members for this top event ca. 2 orders of magnitude 
higher than the reference value (median 2.6E-5, range: 2.6E-06 -1.3E-04). This is obviously 
due to the different perception for the value of the K111_SL event. 
 
Scenario K211 
54 t SO2 release to the environment as a consequence of the catastrophic rupture of the SO2 tank wagon due to 
mechanical impact during wagon change. 
 
The present Scenario is caused by human factors related events, for which the likelihood of 
occurrence is expressed through a probability (q) instead of a frequency. This Scenario is 
described by the fault-tree shown below: 
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 Impact of tanks 
 
Top: K211 
Barrier remains 
open 
 
Exceeding the 
shunting speed 
limit 
Old WT not pulled 
out 
 
The results of the review of the 
BEQUAR members on the probability 
values for the initiating events are shown 
in figures 14 and 15, which refer to the 
events K211_BAR and K211_OUT, 
respectively. K211_SL is simply equal 
to K111_SL and the previous figure 11 
applies.  
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Figure 14: Likelihood of occurrence (per mission) of the K211_BAR event as perceived by the 
BEQUAR members. The bars on the graph represent the distance from the reference value 
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Figure 15: Likelihood of occurrence (per mission) of the K211_OUT event as perceived by the 
BEQUAR members. The bars on the graph represent the distance from the reference value 
 
The BEQUAR group response as a whole is given in table 8 (median and range) and it is 
compared to the values taken as the reference and submitted to review. 
 
 Event Description Type q(ref) q(median) q(range) 
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K211_BAR Operator fault: barrier remains open  Basic 3.0E-02 5.5E-03 
1.00E-03 
3.00E-02 
 
K211_OUT Fault in sequence of operation: wagon wasn't pulled out of tank Basic 3.0E-05 3.0E-05 
1.00E-06 
3.00E-02 
 
K211_SL 
Exceeding the shunting speed limit 
(operator fault) 
 
Basic 1.0E-05 1.0E-3 
 
1.00E-04 
5.00E-03 
 
Table 8 
 
For the event associated to the possibility that barriers remain open, half of the responders 
were in agreement with the reference value whilst the remaining part considered it as less 
likely (ca. 1 decade lower). A large discrepancy was found with the event of fault in the 
sequence operation, as the proposed values scatter of about 4 orders of magnitude from each 
other. 
 
The frequency of the K211 top event resulting from the above values and assuming 10 
missions per year is given in figure 16. This consists of the catastrophic rupture of the SO2 
tank wagon during wagon change. 
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Figure 16: Frequency of the top event as perceived by the BEQUAR members. The bars on the graph 
represent the distance from the reference value 
 
Also in this case the values perceived by the members are higher than the reference value 
(median: 9.00E-09 range: 1.00E-11 - 5.00E-05).  
 
Scenario K221 
Not isolable leakage of due to failure of flange connection AND failure of tank wagon valve; vertical outflow from 
ø40 mm during 10 minutes (time required for mounting the shut-off valve) 
 
The present Scenario is caused by human factors related events, for which the likelihood of 
occurrence is expressed through a probability (q) instead of a frequency. This Scenario is 
described by the fault-tree shown below: 
 
Release from flange   
Top: K221  
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The results of the review of the BEQUAR members on the probability values for the initiating 
events are shown in figures 17-19, which refer to the events K221_AF, K221_GF and 
K221_WV, respectively.  
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Figure 17: Likelihood of occurrence (per mission) of the K221_AF event as perceived by the BEQUAR 
members. The bars on the graph represent the distance from the reference value 
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Figure 18: Likelihood of occurrence (per mission) of the K221_GF event as perceived by the BEQUAR 
members. The bars on the graph represent the distance from the reference value 
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Figure 19: Likelihood of occurrence (per mission) of the K221_WV event as perceived by the BEQUAR 
members. The bars on the graph represent the distance from the reference value 
 
The BEQUAR group response as a whole is given in table 9 (median and range) and it is 
compared to the values taken as the reference and submitted to review. 
 
Event Description Type q(ref) q(median) q(range) 
K221_GF Human error: failed Gasket not properly checked  Basic 1.0E-05 1.00E-03 
1.00E-04 
1.00E-03 
 
K221_AF Human error on Flange adjustment Basic 1.0E-05 1.00E-03 
1.00E-05 
1.00E-03 
 
K221_WV Tank Wagon valve failure Basic 4.2E-03 4.20E-03 
1.00E-04 
5.00E-02 
 
Table 9 
As for the previous cases, the main discrepancies were found on those human related events 
for which the reference likelihood of occurrence was estimated to be very low (ca. 1E-5). 
Specifically this conclusion refers to the failures of not checking properly the gasket 
(K211_GF) and the error in the flange adjustment (K221_AF). For these two events almost 
the totality of responders proposed values 2 decades higher.  
 
For the human error related event consisting of the failure of closing the tank valve 
(K221_WV), the proposed value was considered as appropriate by 4 out of 7 responders. A 
reviewer (member n. 9) proposed to slightly modify the right side of the fault-tree to better 
describe the K221_WV event, by incorporating human error and component failure causes. 
The proposed value lied between 1E-02 and 1E-01 and it was argued that the release would 
make difficult the closing valve operation.    
 
The annual frequency of the K221 top event resulting from the above values and assuming 
10 missions per year is given in figure 20. This consists of a leakage from the flange due to a 
bad connection of the flange itself during wagon change. 
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Figure 20: Frequency of the top event as perceived by the BEQUAR members. The bars on the graph 
represent the distance from the reference value 
 
  
The values perceived by the reviewers were always higher than the reference (median: 2.0E-
05; range 5.0E-08-1.0E-03). A point to note is that amongst the 3 members who agreed with 
the reference value, members 3 and 5 provided their assessment directly on the top event 
without giving information on the basic events.  
 
Scenarios: K121, K131, K151, K161 
The Scenarios of this section refer to the situation in which the sulphur dioxide tank wagon is 
on line. It was supposed that all components were working properly at the beginning of each 
mission (876 h duration).  
 
The different Scenarios are illustrated in figure 21. The critical components that are cause of 
the initiating events are also shown in the figure.  
 
All the Scenarios concerned are caused by failure of components. Their annual frequency can, 
therefore, be estimated from the component failure rate (λ). From the failure rate it is indeed 
possible to calculate the expected number of failures (w) for mission time and than multiply 
this value by the number of missions in a year (10). 
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The BEQUAR memb ved 
components. The results o 4, which refer to: 
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he failure of the tank wagon valve was considered as a human factor related event. Its 
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f this review are given in figures 22, 23, and 2
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review was presented in figure 19 of the previous section. 
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Figure 22: Failure rate (per h-1) of the flange of Scenarios K121 and K151 as perceived by the 
EQUAR members. The bars on the graph represent the distance from the reference value 
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Figure 23: Failure rate (per h-1) of the flexible pipe of Scenarios K131 and K161 as perceived by the 
BEQUAR members. The bars on the graph represent the distance from the reference value 
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Table 10 
 
ld be noticed a quite limited spread of the data from the 
ference value for the flange and protection valve cases. In particular for the flange the 
Event Description λ (h ) REF 
λ (h ) 
Median 
λ (h ) 
Range 
re rate (p 1) of the pr tion valve (s ring valv enarios K
value 
 
The BEQUAR group response as a whole is given in table 10 (median and range) and it is 
compared to the values taken as the reference and submitted to review. 
 
 
 -1 -1 -1
 
 
 
 
K121_FL 
K151_FL Flange leakage 4.0E-07 
 
2.0E-06 
 
4.0E-07 
4.0E-06 
 
 K131_FLEX Flexible pipe  1.00E-09 
K161_FLEX rupture 3.4E-09 3.40E-09  
4.00E-05 
 
K131_PV 
K161_FL 
Protection 
valve 
 4.00E-06 
 
 
 
failure 2.2E-05 2.2E-05  
1.00E-04 
  
By observing the general trend, it cou
re
values proposed (fig. 22) are normally higher than the reference (1 decade at most). For the 
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protection valve (fig. 24) higher and lower values were proposed, but always within a decade 
the 
ference. 
rom the failure frequency values as provided by the BEQUAR reviewers, it was possible to 
calculate the correspondin of the involved components 
through the following f
 
extent. 
 
For the flexible pipe (fig. 23) a much higher spread of data was noticed, for which 3 out of 7 
reviewers proposed values exceeding at least 2 orders of magnitude if compared to 
re
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)exp(1 Mtq λ−−=  
 
ssion time (876 h). 
values of the probability of failure at the end 
volved.  
 BEQUAR member 9 were also 
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where tM is the mi
 
Figures 25-27 gives the of mission for the 
different components in
 
It should be noted that data provided by added. The member 
did not provide failure rat . These values were 
then converted to freque  figures 25-27. A good 
 
 
agreement with the reference value can be noticed, with the exception of the flexible pipe. 
 
1.E-07
1.E-06
1.E-05
1.E-04
1.E-03
1.E-02
1.E-01
1.E+00
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
q(
m
is
si
on
 ti
m
e)
K121/151_FL - q(ref) = 3.50E-04
 
 
Figure 25: Probability of failure per mission of the flange (Scenarios K121 and K151) as perceived by 
the BEQUAR members. The bars on the graph represent the distance from the reference value 
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The following table summarises 
 
 
 
 
 
top events of Scenarios K121, K131, K151, and K161, 
m the above values is given in figu s 28-31. 
 
As expected, Scenarios involving the failure of flexible pipe (K131 and K161) are those 
characterised by a larger spread. This is obviously due to the greater uncertainty on the data 
which refer to this component. 
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igure 27: Probability of failure per mission of the protectionF
p
the results of the review: 
 
 Event Description q (h-1) q(h-1) dian 
q (h-1) 
Range  
 
 
 
 
 
Table 11 
 
he annual frequency of the T
resulting fro re
K121_FL 
K151_FL Flange leakage 
 
50E-04  3.
 4.00E-06 
8.76E-04 3.50E-03 
  
K131_FL
K161_FL
EX 
EX Flexible pipe rupture 2.98E-06 
 
3.20E-06 
 
 
8.76E-07 
3.44E-02 
 
K131_PV 
K161_FL 
Protection valve 
failure 1.88E-02 
 
1.20E-02 
 
2.28E-04 
8.39E-02 
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Figure 28: Annual frequency of the K121 top event as perceived by the BEQUAR members. The bars 
on the graph represent the distance from the reference value 
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Figure 29: Annual frequency of the K131 top event as perceived by the BEQUAR members. The bars 
on the graph represent the distance from the reference value 
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Figure 30: Annual frequency of the K151 top event as perceived by the BEQUAR members. The bars 
on the graph represent the distance from the reference value 
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Figure 31: Annual frequency of the K161 top event as perceived by the BEQUAR members. The bars 
on the graph represent the distance from the reference value 
 
The following table summarise the global response of the BEQUAR members on top events: 
 
 
 Top Event f ( y
-1) 
REF 
f( y-1) 
Median 
f (y-1) 
Range 
K121 3.5E-03 
 
 
 
8.76E-03 
 
3.50E-03 
3.50E-02 
 
K131 5.6E-07  
 
 
 
3.06E-08  3.03E-05 1.77E-03 
   
  8.76E-07 
 K151 1.5E-05  1.47E-05 1.75E-04 
   
 2.36E-09  
K161 2.4E-09 7.94E-07 3.00E-06    
 
Table 12 
3.2 Ethanol related Scenarios 
Scenario A11 
Ethanol release due to catastrophic rupture of the tank.  
 
In case of catastrophic rupture of the tank, the review of the annual frequency by the BEQUAR members is given 
in figure 32. The values are in agreement within a decade. 
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Figure 32: Annual frequency of A11 as perceived by the BEQUAR members. The bars on the graph 
represent the distance from the reference value. 
Scenario A12 
Ethanol release due to not isolable pipe rupture (ø80 mm) 
 
In case of release by pipe rupture, the review of the annual frequency by the BEQUAR members is given in figure 
33. The values are in agreement within a decade with the exception of the data provided by member n.4, who 
provided a value ca 4 orders of magnitude higher. 
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Figure 33: Annual frequency of A11 as perceived by the BEQUAR members. The bars on the graph 
represent the distance from the reference value 
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REVIEW OF THE CONSEQUENCE ASSESSMENT 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The present chapter summarises the main conclusions of the review on the reference 
establishment consequence assessment, which was conducted by the BEQUAR members. As 
usual, the reported analysis refers to the accident Scenarios postulated through the Hazard 
Identification Analysis.  
 
The consequence assessment was completed by the JRC who played the role of the operator 
for this exercise. The analysis was conducted by employing the assumptions made by the 
operator of the actual plant but by using atmospheric data of the fictitious setting where the 
reference establishment was supposed to be located. 
 
Due to the limited resources, it was decided to limit the review to some aspects of the 
consequence analysis only. In particular, the analysis of the damage curves as obtained 
through modelling of the toxic gas dispersion and/or pressure/temperature distributions were 
excluded from the evaluation exercise. This would have had required the availability of codes 
for modelling calculation that was not in possession of several BEQUAR participants.  
 
By contrast, the review was carried out on: 
 
• the conclusions of the ‘source terms’ calculation, which represent the input data for the 
calculation of damage curves.  
• the vulnerability data  (probit values & threshold limits) 
2. SUMMARY OF THE RESULTS OF CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS  
The consequence analysis conducted for the specific purpose of this benchmark was 
conducted by the JRC with the technical assistance of the consultant who conducted the risk 
analysis of the actual plant and of another member of BEQUAR having a specific experience 
in the modelling used for damage assessment. This analysis are presented in separate 
documents19,20. 
 
The next sections contain the results of source terms’ calculations, which were used for the 
consequence assessment.  As damage curves were not submitted to review, the results of 
consequence assessment that relate to this calculation were not reported in the present 
document Detailed information on damage curves’ calculations was reported in the previously 
quoted BEQUAR internal document18. 
 
Finally, the data used to assess the vulnerability are also reported. 
 2.1 Source Term’ results: SO2 related Scenarios 
Background/Assumptions 
The tank wagon full of SO2 was modelled as a cylinder placed at 1.1 m height from the 
concrete surface, with a 3 m diameter and a 10.5 m length (see figure 34). The full tank 
contains 54 tons of liquid SO2 in the saturated condition under temperature of 40º C, which is 
maintained by external water heating (saturated water with temperature 120ºC). 
 
                                                     
19 BEQUAR Internal Document, Accident Consequence Analysis, CNS  Rev. 2.0, Technical note , May 2005 
20 BEQUAR Internal Document, Probit parameters for the BEQUAR case study, VLN Data  Rev. 2.0, Technical 
note , January 2006 
  Page 53 
Final Report    
Atmospheric data were imported from the JRC’s meteorological service web21,22. Four 
different periods were taken in consideration and the data are shown in table 14. The fictitious 
location is in an industrial area highly populated with a terrain roughness value of Z = 0.17. 
 
 
Figure 34: Schematic drawing of the tank wagon 
 
 Air  Temp, 
º C 
Surface Temp, 
º C 
Solar irr. flux, 
kW/m2
Pressure, 
bar 
Relative 
humidity, 
% 
Atm. Stability, 
Pasquill 
Wind 10 m 
above ground, 
m/s 
Winter – day 6.4 6.1 0.6 1 73 B/C 3,2 
Winter – night 3 4.8 0 1 84 F 2,3 
27.1 27.3 0.7 1 67 B/C 3,6 Summer – day 
14.3 16.5 0 1 79 F 2,3 Summer – night 
Table 13: Environmental parameters 
The calculations presented in the following sections were carried out by using PHAST 6.42 
(DNV Technica, Norway)23 under the following assumptions: 
 
• The backflow in the pipe bridge was neglected in each case as the target tank contains 
SO2 in water solution and the content within the pipe bridge itself is negligible.  
• The level of liquid within the tank wagon is always supposed to be above the submerged 
pipe end (see figure 34). This means that the outflow is always in liquid phase. 
 
Material data were taken from the material data library available within PHAST. 
 
Scenario K111 Tank rupture 
Simulated as catastrophic rupture. 
Result: Two-phase release of all content (54 t) of the wagon at once 
Scenario K121 Isolable leakage on the pipe, before the pipe failure protector valve 
Simulated as equivalent ø10 mm horizontal leak at the height of 4.35 m. 
Result: Two-phase horizontal release with mass flow rate practically constant in time (ca. 1.8 
kg/s – see next table), at the height of 4.35 m. 
 
 
Mass flow rate, kg/s Time, min. 
1.83 0 
1.82 16.5 
1.81 32 
1.80 49.5 
                                                     
21 http://iamest.jrc.it/meteo/meteo.php 
22 http://re.jrc.cec.eu.int/pvgis/pv/imaps/imaps.htm
23 http://www.dnv.com/software/all/phast/productInfo.asp 
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Table 14: Mass flow rate for the ø10 mm horizontal leak 
Comment: The loss effect due to the submerged ø40 mm pipe has been neglected because the 
flow rate from a 40mm pipe is approximately (8.8 kg/s), which is much higher of the obtained 
values. 
  
Scenario K131 Isolable leakage on the flexible pipe 
Simulated as ø25 mm vertical outflow from the pipe of the length of 0.65 m at the height of 5 
m. 
Result: Two-phase vertical release with mass flow rate practically constant in time (3.9 kg/s – 
see next table), at the height of 5 m. 
 
Mass flow rate, 
kg/s 
Time, min. 
3.93 0 
3.90 7.6 
3.87 15.3 
3.84 23 
3.81 31 
Table 15: Vertical outflow mass flow rate from ø25 mm pipe 
Comment: The loss effect due to the submerged ø40 mm pipe has been neglected because the 
flow rate from a 40mm pipe is approximately 8.8 kg/s, which is much higher of the obtained 
values. 
Scenario K151 Not isolable leakage on the pipe, before the pipe failure protector valve 
Simulated as Scenario K121, followed by ø40 mm vertical outflow from the pipe of the 
length of 3.25 m at the height of 4.35 m.  
Result: Horizontal two-phase release with average mass flow rate of ca. 1.8 kg/s, for 20 or 30 
minutes at the height of 4.35 m, followed by vertical two-phase release with mass flow rate of 
approximately 8.8 kg/s – see next table, for 10 minutes at the height of 4.35 m. 
 
Mass flow rate, 
kg/s 
Time, min. 
8.9 0 
8.85 3.4 
8.8 6.75 
8.75 10.2 
8.7 13.6 
8,65  17,0 
8,60  20,5 
8,55  24 
8,50  27,5 
8,45  31,0 
8,40  34,6 
Table 16: Vertical outflow mass flow rate from ø40 mm pipe 
Scenario K161 Not Isolable leakage on the flexible pipe 
Simulated as Scenario K131, followed by ø40 mm vertical outflow from the pipe of the 
length of 3.25 m at the height of 4.35 m. 
Result: Two-phase vertical release with mass flow rate of approximately 3.9 kg/s, for 20 or 30 
minutes at the height of 5 m, followed by vertical two-phase release with mass flow rate 8.8 
kg/s, for 10 minutes at the height of 4.35 m. 
 
Scenario K211 Tank rupture 
Simulated as Scenario K111. 
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Result: Two-phase release of all content (54 t) of the wagon at once 
 
Scenario K221 Not isolable release before the shut-off valve line 
Simulated as Scenario K151. 
Result: Horizontal two-phase release with mass flow rate approximately 1.81 kg/s, for 20 or 
30 minutes at the height of 4.35 m, followed by vertical two-phase release with mass flow rate 
8.8 kg/s, for 10 minutes at the height of 4.35 m.  
2.2 Source Terms’ results: Ethanol related Scenarios 
Background/Assumptions 
The ethanol storage concrete tanks of cylindrical shape with different dimensions were 
supposed to be 100% full of liquid ethanol under environmental conditions. The tanks stand 
on the ground inside a concrete bund. Temperature was supposed to be maintained through 
external water-cooling by 20.1°C during hot summer time. Fire and explosion consequences 
of the material were simulated. The results showed that evaporation from the pool in the bund 
after a possible accident is very low and only pool fire is of practical importance. As a matter 
of fact ethanol has normal boiling point at 78-79ºC, with flash point at 13ºC.  
 
It is reminded that the involved Scenarios were of two types: 
• Scenario A11_x:  catastrophic rupture of tank N. x 
• Scenario A12_x : tank drainage nozzle rupture ø80mm on the tank N. x 
 
The backflow in the pipe bridge was neglected for Scenarios A12_x, as the backflow 
prevention valve is supposed to work correctly. 
 
All catastrophic rupture Scenarios - A11_1 – A11_10  
Simulated as catastrophic rupture. 
Result: Spray release of all content at once with immediate rain-out of droplets. All material is 
contained in the bund. 
 
A12_1 Tank drainage nozzle rupture ø80mm on the tank No. 1 
Simulated as horizontal leak ø80mm. 
Result: Liquid release with variable rate – see next figure. Average rate for consequence 
analysis taken is 24,21 kg/s. The outflow time is 72 hours. All material is contained in the 
bund. 
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Figure 35: Tank outflow rate for the A12_1 case: Summer day  
A12_2 Tank drainage nozzle rupture ø80mm on the tank No. 2 
Simulated as horizontal leak ø80mm. 
Result: Liquid release with variable rate – see next figure. Average outflow rate for 
consequence analysis used is 19,57 kg/s. The outflow time is 35 hours. All material is 
contained in the bund. 
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Case A12_2, Summer day
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Figure 36: Tank outflow rate for the A12_2 case: Summer day 
A12_3 Tank drainage nozzle rupture ø80mm on the tank No. 3 
Simulated as horizontal leak ø 80mm. 
Result: Liquid release with variable rate – see next figure. Average outflow mass rate taken 
for consequence analysis is 15,69 kg/s. The outflow time is 20 hours. All material is 
contained in the bund. 
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Figure 37: Tank mass outflow rate for the case A12_3: Summer day 
 
A12_6/7 Tank drainage nozzle rupture ø80mm on the tank No. 6/7 
Simulated as horizontal leak ø 80mm. 
Result: Liquid release with variable rate – see next figure. Average outflow rate taken for 
consequence analysis is 17,96 kg/s. Time to full outflow is 11,23 hours. All material is 
contained in the bund. 
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Figure 38: Tank outflow rate for the case A12_6/7, Summer day 
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A12_10 Tank drainage nozzle rupture ø80mm on the tank No. 10 
Simulated as horizontal leak ø80mm. 
Result: Liquid release with variable rate – see Figure 39. Average outflow rate taken for 
consequence analysis is 14,58 kg/s. Time to full outflow is 3,43 hours. All material is 
contained in the bund. 
Case A12_10, Summer day
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Figure 39: Mass outflow for the case A12_10, Summer day 
2.3 Vulnerability data 
In the study of consequence assessment, the last logical step to be covered is usually the 
estimate of the consequences on the man and the environment. Once the modelling of the 
accidents’ effects (thermal radiation, pressure wave, evolution of the concentration in the 
atmosphere) have been completed, the conversion of these results to the consequences is 
required. This can be done by the so-called “vulnerability analysis”. In order to estimate 
consequences of an accident on humans, a function relating the magnitude of the impact, e.g. 
the thermal radiation from a fire, with the extent of damage caused by accident is required; 
i.e., a relationship between the dose and the response must be defined. Usually for the QRA 
purposes, the method used is the analysis based on Probit functions. In other cases the 
analysis is concluded by the assessment of the safety distances only. In these cases, the 
concentration field is compared to threshold limits (i.e. a limit on a measurable quantity, 
established or formally accepted by a regulatory body). 
 
The following table describes the alternative vulnerability parameters which were used in the 
benchmark. The data represented in bold are those used as the reference values in the risk 
analysis:   
  
Probit estimation Safety limit values 
Effect 
type 
Probit equation (lethality) Effect 
type 
Acceptable threshold values 
-38,48+2,56ln(tExposure[s].Heat intensity [W/m2]4/3) 
[24] 
2kW/m2 25 - 2nd degree burns in 20 s [ ] Heat 
radiation 
Heat 
radiation 
-14,9+2,56ln(tExposure.Heat intensity4/3) [26]  12,5kW/m2 27 - 2nd degree burns in 20 s [ ] 
                                                     
24 Phast 6.42 documentation, Det Norske Veritas, 2004 
25  B.R. Williamson, L.R.B. Mann, “Thermal hazards from propane (LPG) fireballs,” Combust. Sci. Tech., vol. 25, 
1981, p. 141 
26 F.P. Lees, “Loss Prevention in the Process Industries,” 2nd ed., Butterworth-Heinemann, Oxford, UK, 1980 
27 Rijnmond Public Authority (1982). A Risk Analysis of 6 Potentially Hazardous Industrial Objects in the 
Rijnmond Area-A Pilot Study. D. Reidel, Dordrecht, The Netherlands and Boston, MA. (ISBN 90-277-1393-6) 
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4/3-36,38+2,56ln(tExposure.Heat intensity ) [28] 
-39,83+3,0186ln(texposure.Heat intensity4/3) [ ]32
35 kW/m2 29 for 20 s  - 50% fatality [ ] 
[ ]28 305-5,74ln{f(PeakOverpressure, patm,BodyWeight}  2,4-3,1 bar – 1% fatality [ ] Explosion 
blast 
wave 
Explosion 
blast 
wave 311 bar – 1% fatality [ ] -77,1+6,91ln(PeakOverpressure [Pa]) [] 
2,4 [ ]24-16,89+ln(Concentration  [ppm]. tExposure [min]) SO
-17,73+2,1ln(Concentration[mg/m3].tExposure min]) 
[] 
ERPG-2 
-27,9+1,14ln(Concentration3,7 [mg/m3]tExposure [min]) 
[] 
2 
toxicity 
SO2 
toxicity 
IDLH 
32-15,67+2,1ln(Concentration[ppm]. t  [min]) [ ] Exposure
Table 17: vulnerability data used for BEQUAR. The data indicated in bold are those considered as 
reference values for this exercise and used for the risk analysis phase 
 
Toxicity 
The problem of the usage of probit functions for toxics is that, for majority of substances 
encountered in industry, there are not enough data on toxic responses of humans to directly 
determine a substance’s hazard potential. Often, the only data available are from controlled 
experiments conducted on laboratory animals. In these cases, it is necessary to extrapolate 
from the effects observed in animals to effects likely to occur in humans. This extrapolation 
introduces great uncertainty. Also, many releases involve several chemical components or 
multiple effects. At this time the cumulative effects of simultaneous exposure to more than 
one material is not well understood.  Finally, there is no standardised toxicology testing 
protocols that exist for studying episodic releases on animals. There are experimental 
problems associated with the testing of toxic chemicals at high concentrations for very short 
durations in establishing the concentration/timer profile. 
 
Generally there are two main sources of data, which are characterised by significant 
differences. One source of information is based on material-specific studies [ref 32 of 
previous page], the other one is based on the use of a generalised extrapolation scheme [ref 28 
of previous page]. The difference between the available formulas could be significant as also 
shown in Table 17, and could lead to a significant difference in prediction of the extent of the 
effects of toxic release.  
 
Concerning the usage of the safety limits, there is also a quite large spread of data in the 
literature. The data reported in Table 17 lead to safety distances which differ in an order of 
magnitude.  
 
Blast effects. 
Concerning the blast effects to humans the two main sources of Probit were taken into 
account for the present analysis. 
                                                     
28 Methods for determination of possible damage to people and objects resulting from releases of hazardous 
material, CPR 16E, 1st edition, TNO, Voorburg, 1992 
29 S. Mannan, “Lees’s Loss Prevention in the Process Industries,” 3rd ed., Elsevier Butterworth-Heinemann, 
Oxford, UK, 2005 
30 S. Glasstone, “The effects of nuclear weapons,” AS AEC, Washington, 1962 
31 N.A. Eisenberg at al., “Vulnerability model,” Nat. Tech. Int. Service Report AD-A015-245, Springfield, Va, 
1975 
32 Guidelines for Process Quantitative Risk Analysis, CCPS of AIChE, N. York, 1999 
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Heat radiation effects. 
There are several probit equations that describe the relation between thermal radiation dosage 
and fatalities (see Table 17). Also in this case the differences are significant. Concerning the 
usage of the safety distances, there is also spread of acceptable values.  
 3. REVIEW OF THE SOURCE TERMS’ DATA 
The source terms’ results were submitted to the BEQUAR members for discussion and 
review. Amongst the eight responders, different approaches were followed for justifying their 
argumentations. In particular, some assessed the results qualitatively whilst others followed a 
more quantitative approach.  
 
The review was conducted by the BEQUAR responders through their reply to a questionnaire 
prepared by the JRC for this purpose. Detailed discussions followed during a project meeting. 
3.1 Reaction and repair time 
The reaction time after release is the time required to settle the problem and to intervene for 
stopping the release. The reference values submitted to the reviewers were 20 min and 30 
min, in the cases in which the gas detection sensors are present or not, respectively. For some 
specific Scenarios (i.e., K151 and K161) associated to not isolable release (e.g. by closing a 
valve) some additional time to repair the component failure is required. During this action the 
opening of the flange is necessary, which is associated to an additional horizontal release of 
toxic gas. The reference value provided by the operator is 10 min. 
 
18As a result of the consequence assessment study previously quoted , t, which the reaction 
time after release from the SO2 tank do not seem to affect significantly the concentration 
curve of toxics. However the time of exposure and, in turn, the absorbed dose will definitely 
depend on this reaction time.  
 
The BEQUAR reviewers were asked about their perception on the most suitable reaction time 
to be considered for the SO2 related Scenarios with the exception of the catastrophic releases. 
The results are shown in the figures 35 and 36 that represent the different situations in which 
the detection sensors are present or not present, respectively. 
 
In both cases ca. 50% of the reviewers tend to prefer more conservative values.  
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Figure 40: BEQUAR review on the reaction time after release in the case: “sensors present” 
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Figure 41: BEQUAR review on the reaction time after release in the case: “sensors not -present” 
 
With regard to the repair time, the reviewers were asked about their perception on the 
acceptability of the value provided by the operator. The reference value of 10 minutes was 
considered as very optimistic by the majority of the responders (see next figure). It was 
suggested the need to conduct some specific sensitivity studies on this aspect and it was 
mentioned that also some different meteorological conditions might influence the repairing 
activity (a rainy weather can transform into aerosols the sulphur dioxide and increased the 
toxicity). 
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 Figure 42: Acceptability of the repair time provided by the operator (10 min) 
3.2 Source terms 
SO  related Scenarios2  
Figure 43 shows the response of the BEQUAR reviewers in relation to the acceptability of the 
source terms’ data presented in the previous chapter. For all the selected Scenarios the totality 
of responders considered the calculation as acceptable by responding ‘to agree’ on the final 
result.  
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Figure 43: Source term calculations: acceptability by the BEQUAR reviewers (for SO ) 2
 
Ethanol related Scenarios 
Also for Ethanol, the majority of responders considered the source terms’ calculations as 
acceptable (see Figure 44). However a few declared to disagree on the final results by using 
the following argumentation: 
 
• Difficulty in the judgment due to a not totally clear description of Scenarios A11_1 - 
A11_10 
• Anomalous behaviour of outflow rate in all Ethanol Scenarios 
• Overestimated distance to 0,02 bar overpressure from all Ethanol explosions 
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Figure 44: Source term calculations: acceptability by the BEQUAR reviewers (for Ethanol) 
 
General observations during the meeting 
In general the review showed that that for some countries, the worst-case Scenario 
(catastrophic rupture) is the only actually required for full evaluation. In others there is still 
the requirement for extending the analysis to all selected Scenarios, and in general the 
operator is entitled to select the methodology to be used. As a general comment it was 
established that no common methodology for consequence analysis is available/required in 
the new Member States. There is a clear understanding that a possible guidance in this filed 
would be more than welcomed.  
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4. REVIEW OF THE VULNERABILITY DATA  
Nine of the BEQUAR members provided their review of the vulnerability data set. In 
particular they were asked to mark the probit formulas or the threshold values that they would 
consider as acceptable. The results of their choices is summarised in tables 18-19 and in 
figures 45-47.  
 
To be noted that multiple marks were permitted, therefore, the number of marks for each 
category do not necessarily correspond to the number of responders. 
 
Probit estimation 
Effect type Probit equation (lethality) BEQUAR 
response 
-16,89+ln(Concentration[ppm]. tExposure [min]2,4) [DNV Technica, 
2004] 
3 marks SO2 toxicity 
-17,73+2,1ln(Concentration[mg/m3]. tExposure [min]) [CPR 16E, TNO, 
1992] 
3 marks 
 -27,9+1,14ln(Concentration[mg/m3]. tExposure [min]3,7) [CPR 16E, 
TNO, 1992] 
1 marks 
-15,67+2,1ln(Concentration[mg/m3]. tExposure [min]) [CCPS Guidelines, 
1999] 
2 marks 
-38,48+2,56ln(tExposure[s].Heat intensity [W/m2]4/3) [DNV Technica, 
2004] 
4 marks Heat 
radiation 
-14,9+2,56ln(10-4.tExposure.Heat intensity4/3) [Lees, 1980] 1 marks 
-36,38+2,56ln(tExposure.Heat intensity4/3) [CPR 16E, TNO, 1992] 4 marks 
-39,83+3,0186ln(tExposure.Heat intensity4/3) [AichE, 1999] 2 marks 
5-5,74ln{f(PeakOverpressure, patm, BodyWeight} [CPR 16E, TNO, 1992]  5 marks 
-77,1+6,91ln(PeakOverpressure [Pa]) [Lees, 1980] 2 marks 
Explosion 
blast wave 
Other. 0 marks 
Table 18: Preferences of the BEQUAR reviewers for the different proposed probit formulas 
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Threshold limits 
Effect type Acceptable threshold values BEQUAR 
response 
ERPG-2 (3 ppm) 4 marks SO2 toxicity 
EEL 0 marks 
IDLH (100 ppm) 5 marks 
Other (describe). 0 marks 
2kW/m2 - 2nd degree burns in 20 s [Williamson&Mann, 1981] 0 marks 
12,5kW/m2 - 2nd degree burns in 20 s [Rijnmond study, 1982] 3 marks 
Heat 
radiation 
35 kW/m2 for 20 s  - 50% fatality [Mannan, 2005] 3 marks 
Other values proposed by the BEQUAR members  3 marks 
(4,7 kW/m2, 5 kW/m2, 3 kW/m2) 
2,4-3,1 bar – 1% fatality [Glasstone, 1962] 0 marks 
1 bar – 1% fatality [Eisenberg, 1975] 6 marks 
Explosion 
blast wave 
0,14 bar 1 marks 
Table 19: Preferences of the BEQUAR reviewers for the different proposed threshold limits 
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Figure 45: SO2 toxicity effects: preferences of the BEQUAR reviewers for the different proposed probit 
formulas & threshold values 
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Figure 46: Heat radiation effects: preferences of the BEQUAR reviewers for the different proposed 
probit formulas & threshold values  
  
Figure 47: Blast wave overpressure: preferences of the BEQUAR reviewers for the different proposed 
probit formulas & threshold values  
 
For toxic related parameters, it is quite evident the BEQUAR responders did not show any 
specific preference for the proposed probit formulas. The same can be stated for threshold 
limits. During the discussions that took place at the M3 meeting (Ispra 30-31 January, 2006) it 
was commonly agreed that in general any of the presented values and formulas have the right 
to be considered as acceptable for safety report purposes. As a matter of fact it is very difficult 
to assess which of the available formulas is more reliable. For this reason, a case by case 
approach should be followed depending on the potential impact of each single Scenario and 
the assumptions made (e.g., release times). It was however argued that at present the choice 
on the specific  probit formulas to be used is often driven by practical reasons i.e. their 
availability in the literature or in the web, free of charge (e.g. US EPA's Aloha and TNO's 
books). In this sense all BEQUAR members supported the concept that the European 
Commission should drive an action oriented to collect and validate this type of data for risk 
analysis applications. 
 
For heat radiation a quite spread of responses was noticed. For probit, all the proposed 
formulas received some attention, although TNO and DNV received the maximum scoring. 
The threshold limits selected by the different responders also varied quite significantly. Some 
of the BEQUAR reviewers proposed also some alternative values (4,7 kW/m2, 5 kW/m2, 3 
kW/m2) 
 
For overpressure related Scenarios, the probit formula of TNO was definitely the preferred. 
As a threshold limit 1 bar was estimated to be the blast wave effect limit for almost the 
totality of responders. 
4.1 Summary of the vulnerability analysis review  
In general, the proposed formulas and values were considered as acceptable by the BEQUAR 
reviewers and it was not possible to detect any difference in the approaches followed in the 
different countries.  
 
The general impression from the comments and discussions was that the position of the 
competent authorities in the newly associated Member States is in line with what it is 
generally accepted in the other countries.  
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The main outcome of this review and the following discussions is that, in general, no common 
methodology for consequence analysis is strictly required in the newly associated Member 
States.  
 
There is a clear understanding that a possible guidance in this filed would be more than 
welcomed. Also the availability of codes for modelling calculation is not broadly available. 
This was is further impediment for the competent authorities in their daily supervising 
activity. 
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REVIEW OF THE ANALYSIS OF RISKS AND AREA RISK ANALYSIS  
1. INTRODUCTION 
The present chapter is addressed to analyse the impact of the different reviews conducted by 
the BEQUAR members on the overall risk analysis of the reference establishment and, in 
turn, on the area risk assessment.  
 
The reference risk analysis was conducted by the JRC who played the role of the operator for 
this exercise. This analysis was conducted by re-elaborating some of the original data, 
assumptions and calculations available on the original safety report of the reference plant as 
described in the previous chapter. These were then used as input data for ARIPAR, which was 
used to produce the reference risk analysis outcome. As previously highlighted, the difference 
from the original data set, assumption, calculations and risk assessment methods, made the 
review of the reference risk analysis fully independent of the actual case. This guarantees the 
full non addressability of the conclusions of this study to the actual plant and associated 
surroundings used for this exercise. 
 
The impact of the reviews on the risks of the reference establishment and the overall area risk 
was analysed through ARIPAR by using the input risk analysis data (source terms, frequency 
data, and vulnerability models) reviewed by each BEQUAR members. 
2. SUMMARY OF THE RESULTS OF THE RISK OF THE REFERENCE PLANT  
2.1 Methodology 
The analysis of risks associated to the reference establishment was conducted in quantitative 
terms by using the ARIPAR methodology. The risk quantification procedure was carried out 
by aggregating all the risks associated to the different hazardous sources. All separate 
accident Scenarios described in the previous sections together with their occurrence 
frequencies and consequences (measured in terms of number of casualties) were taken into 
account for the calculation. 
  
In order to represent the outcome of the analysis the following indicators were calculated: 
 
i. Local risk: i.e. the expected frequency of the reference damage (death of people) 
occurring as a consequence of any accident, to a person who is permanently 
occupying (24 hours a day for one year) a certain point of the area, with no possibility 
of being sheltered or evacuated. It is a figure useful for characterising the risk in a 
given location. In ARIPAR the local risk has two types of representation, as risk 
contours, on the overall geographic area, and as a histogram showing, for a given 
location x, y, the risk value and the contribution of the different risk sources. 
 
ii. The Societal Risk which addresses the number of people who might be affected by the 
accident. A F-N curve is a plot of the inverse cumulative frequency (F) of accidents 
from all the different sources capable of causing the reference damage to a number of 
people greater than or equal to N. The F-N curve is a figure useful for characterising 
the societal consequences of possible accidents. The frequency F naturally decreases 
as the number of fatalities increase. The limits of risk acceptability are shown as two 
parallel straight lines on the same diagram, with an area between them in which 
reduction is desirable.  
 
The first step of the process was the identification of the impact area, i.e. the geographical 
area within which the consequences of potential accidents had to be studied. The extension of 
the impact area was selected on the basis of considerations about the a-priori judgement of the 
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impact of potential accidents on the population as a whole. As already stated in a previous 
chapter, the environmental setting of the reference plant was intentionally modified to ensure 
anonymity. In particular, the exercise was conducted by assuming that the reference plant was 
based in a completely different location characterised by different local vulnerability, 
population density and distribution, and different weather conditions.  
 
The analysis of risks was conducted by following the main steps described hereunder: 
 
A. Description of the geographical area of interest 
The first step was the definition of the source area, where the risk sources are located, and of 
the impact area, where the risk has to be determined. The impact area must be described by 
means of territorial data e.g. population density, high vulnerability resorts, transport networks. 
In addition, the risk analysis was performed by considering the solar year as reference time 
period. Since both the meteorological conditions and the population distribution vary with 
time, the whole year was subdivided into separate periods in which both the meteorological 
data and the population distribution can be considered constant with an acceptable degree of 
approximation. In the present case two separate periods were considered: (i) Summer-Spring 
and (ii) Winter-Autumn  
 
B. Identification and inventory of accident risk sources  
Storage, process plants and transport of dangerous substances define the risk sources, which 
exist on a territory where residents, workers and tourist live and could be subject to the 
potential consequences of an accident. The data collection has to be carried out with particular 
care and it represents therefore one of the most expensive phases. Data related to stored, 
processed and transported dangerous substances are collected in order to gain a detailed 
knowledge of annual flows and preferential courses in the impact area, besides giving the 
basic inputs for the accident frequency evaluation. 
 
C. The off-line analysis of all accident Scenarios of interest 
This includes identification and evaluation of likely accident Scenarios (gas dispersion, fire 
and explosion events, their probabilities and consequences) for each fixed installation and 
each type of transport. Generally this is another time consuming phase of the project because 
complex industrial realities must be analysed and accident typologies and frequencies in 
transport characterised. 
 
D. The area risk assessment 
The above mentioned measures of local, individual and societal risk are used as indicators of 
the area risk resulting from the merging of point risk sources (plants) and linear risk sources 
(different ways of transport).  
 
The ARIPAR methodology uses a powerful numerical procedure able to overcome 
computational difficulties arising from: 
 
• the non symmetric distribution of local and individual risk around sources, when 
Scenarios depending on wind rose must be simulated;  
• the need to manage a large number of accident Scenarios; 
• the presence of linear risk sources, caused by accidents travelling with vehicles 
(trucks, trains, ships) or with mass flows (in pipelines), which must be represented by 
many point sources (segments of fixed lengths). 
 
Values of local and individual risk are calculated for the centres of the cells of a non regular 
grid superimposed to the impact area. At the same points the distributed population is 
clustered for societal risk evaluation purposes, so that an accurate choice of cells dimension 
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must be done to assure a good compromise between accuracy of results and acceptable 
computation time. 
Time saving is also the aim of interpolation functions through which accident consequences 
are modelled. The results of each single accidental Scenario, available from numerical codes 
for discrete points only, are substituted by continuous functions representing the time and/or 
spatial distribution of concentrations, over pressures and thermal radiation. 
2.2 Input data 
Introduction  
As for any risk analysis tool, ARIPAR requires the use of some general parameters which are 
specifically associated to the environmental setting which refer to the following 
subcategories: 
 
− Meteorological data. 
− Population categories and population density. 
− Accidents exposure times. 
− Mitigation parameters. 
 
Meteo aggregation and meteorological data  
With ARIPAR the accident consequence analysis is performed off-line considering different 
aggregations of Wind velocity - Pasquill stability classes. The number and type of 
aggregations are generally determined at the beginning of the study on the basis of the 
meteorological conditions during the reference year.  In the present case, two aggregations 
were considered: 
 
Pasquill stability class Aggregation Wind speed 
1 C 3.6 
2 F+G 2.3 
 
The area risk was calculated considering a wind rose, for each different time period (Summer-
Spring and Winter-Autumn), expressing the wind direction and corresponding probability. 
The data employed for the present case are depicted in Figure 48 and Figure 49. 
 
  
a)                b) 
Figure 48: Summer-Spring, a) Pasquil C – WS 3.6, b) Pasquil F+G – WS 2.3 
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a)                b) 
Figure 49: Autumn-Winter, a) Pasquil C – WS 3.6, b) Pasquil F+G – WS 2.3 
 
The wind is supposed to blow towards the centre of the wind rose and its probability is given 
for 16 sectors (22.5 degree wide). 
  
Population Categories and population presence 
The determination of the social risk requires the distribution of the population in the impact 
area. In addition ARIPAR allows classifying the population into different classes depending 
on their exposure frequency expressed in term of time presence in the given point. Example of 
population classes is residents, workers, etc. Each category is defined by the probability of 
presence indoor and outdoor during day and night and for each time period. In the present 
case the following classes/probabilities were considered: 
 
Classes Spring - Summer Autumn - Winter 
 Indoor probability Outdoor probability Indoor probability Outdoor probability 
0.5 0.5 0.8 0.2 Residents 
0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 Workers 
0.1 0.9 0.7 0.3 People involved in 
leisure activities 
(sport) 
 
The population can be seen as uniformly distributed into small zones (polygons) covering the 
residential, industrial, commercial areas. Each zone is surrounded by the sides a polygon. Few 
attributes are then associated with the polygon, e.g. name, type, population density. In the 
case of the present benchmark the population distribution is illustrated in Figure 50. 
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Figure 50: Population distribution around the reference plant (the legend indicated the number of 
people distributed in areas with the specified colour) 
 
Description of the point risk sources  
Each accidental Scenario postulated in the hazard identification analysis is associated to a risk 
source from which it can originate. The risk sources of the BEQUAR exercise are depicted in 
Figure 51.  
 
For each risk source the following data set was uploaded on the ARIPAR database: 
 
• Frequency of the initiating and top events. 
• Consequence analysis results.  
• Exposure times which are necessary to calculate the doses. 
• A mitigation factor which is a multiplicative factor accounting of the possible 
protection measures of the individuals against the accident effects (e.g. being indoor 
or outdoor). The value 1 of this parameter means no protection, whereas the value 0 
means total protection.  
 
For all the BEQUAR Scenarios a mitigation factor equal to 0.5 was used. 
Final Report    
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Figure 51: Risk sources (red triangles) from the potential accidents could originate 
2.3 Risk calculation for selected sources 
The determination of the area risk is performed for a selected subset of risk sources. This 
procedure sums up the risk contributions of the Scenarios of the selected sources in each point 
of the calculation grid. The present section describes the results of the area risk analysis 
conducted by: (i) aggregating the risks of all sources and (ii) considering the contribution of 
each single accident Scenario on the final risk. The calculation was conducted by considering 
all accident Scenarios described in the previous sections, the accident frequency data listed on 
Table 6 on page 38, the consequence damage curves as calculated by using PHAST 6.42 
(DNV Technica, Norway), and the vulnerability models marked in bold of Table 17 on page 
59. 
 
Local Risk 
The contribution to local risk by all risk sources is depicted in Figure 52. This shows that the 
risk is mainly concentrated within the reference plant and, to some extent, in the northern 
direction.  The major contribution to risk is given by the presence of the tank wagon 
containing sulphur dioxide. This can be established by comparing the local risk figure 
obtained by considering separately the contribution by the tank wagon and the ethanol tanks 
(Figure 53).   
 
The contribution to the overall risk by the different accident Scenarios, which are associated 
to the tank wagon risk source, is shown in Figure 54. From this comparison, it is evident the 
major role played by Scenarios K111 and K121. The first refers to the catastrophic rupture of 
the tank which account for the spread of risk in a highly populated area, whist the second that 
is associated to the flange failure, is responsible for higher values of risk concentrated within 
the plant but with negligible off-site effects. All the other Scenarios provide negligible 
contribution to the overall risk both on site and off site.  
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Figure 52: Local risk of the BEQUAR plant: contribution by all risk sources 
 
 
 
 
A)      B) 
 
Figure 53: Contribution to risk by: A) Tank Wagon and B) Ethanol Tanks 
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K111 K211 K221
K121: Isolable flange failure
K131: Isolable flex. pipe failure 
K151: Not Isolable flange failure 
K161: Not Isolable flex. pipe failure 
 
Figure 54: Contribution to local risk by the different Scenarios  
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Societal risk 
As previously described the societal risk is represented by ARIPAR through the F-N curve 
which is a graph of the inverse cumulative frequency of accidents capable of causing the 
reference damage to a number of people greater than or equal to N.  
 
The FN curve calculated by considering the population distribution previously described is 
reported in Figure 55 whilst the contribution to the societal risk by the different accident 
Scenarios is shown in Figure 56. The figure shows the contribution of the five first Scenarios, 
which provide a contribution to risk. The effect of the other Scenarios was negligible and, 
therefore, it was not reported. 
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Figure 55: FN curve for BEQUAR reference plant 
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Figure 56: Contribution to societal risk by the different accident Scenarios 
 
From Figure 56 it is evident that, under the assumptions of the present study, the only 
accident Scenario contributing to off-site risk is the catastrophic rupture of the sulphur 
dioxide wagon tank due to collision with other railway tank wagon (K111), which has some 
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potential (even if quite unlikely) of producing harm to a number of people greater of 10. All 
the other Scenarios are more associated to occupational safety related issues as their effect is 
mainly confined within the plant. 
 
ARIPAR provides also a ranking of the different accident Scenarios in term of their 
contribution to the overall risk. The result of this calculation is given in the table below: 
 
 
% to the overall 
risk Scenario Description 
Tank wagon catastrophic rupture due to 
collision with other railway tank wagon K111 62.23 
Isolable flange leakage: ø10 mm horizontal 
outflow during 20 minutes (isolable) K121 37.57 
Not Isolable flange leakage: ø10 mm 
horizontal outflow (20 min) & vertical 
outflow from ø40 mm (10 min)  
K151 0.16 
Tank wagon catastrophic rupture due to 
collision during tank wagon change K211 0.02 
A11 pool fire 0.006 Catastrophic rupture of A1 tank: delayed fire  
Catastrophic rupture of A1 tank: delayed uvc 
explosion A11 uvc 0.003 
 
Table 20: Risk ranking for the different accident Scenarios 
3. RISK ANALYSIS REVIEW    
3.1 General 
The focus of the preset session is on the impact of the different reviews conducted by the 
BEQUAR members on the overall risk analysis of the reference establishment. For each 
BEQUAR member, different risk maps and FN curves were produced and compared. These 
were calculated by using their reviewed data as input data for ARIPAR. Specifically, as it was 
shown in the previous chapters, it consisted of the frequencies of the accident Scenarios, the 
release times and the vulnerability models used to conduct the risk analysis.  
 
The preliminary comparison of the risks, as produced by using the review data of the different 
BEQUAR members, was conducted during a project meeting (M3, 30-31 January 2006, 
Ispra). The purpose of the meeting was also to simulate the discussion between the ‘fictitious’ 
operator of the reference plant (JRC) and the safety authority ‘inspector’ (BEQUAR 
members). The ‘inspector’ was supposed to communicate his/her remarks to the operator 
concerning the proper position on the reference risk analysis. It was therefore also the 
occasion in which the BEQUAR members had the possibility to reconsider their positions is 
relation to certain data that they suggested to modify in their review. The BEQUAR members 
where then asked to introduce the new set of the reviewed data directly into ARIPAR and to 
run their area risk analysis exercise. 
 
The results of the calculations obtained by using ARIPAR are reported from Figure 57 to 
Figure 74, which represent the impact on risk analysis of the reviewing action on the input 
data, for each member of BEQUAR.  
 
From a first comparison, the difference amongst BEQUAR members is quite evident both in 
terms of: 
• the absolute figure of risk (the overall risk is much higher for some members than 
others) 
• the relevance of the different Scenarios in contributing to the overall risk . 
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In general, the majority of the BEQUAR members assessed a higher risk if compared to the 
reference estimate (see Figure 52 and Figure 55), which denotes their more conservative 
approach.  
 
 
Figure 57: Local Risk calculated by using BEQUAR Member N. 3’s input data 
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Figure 58: Societal Risk calculated by using BEQUAR Member N. 3’s input data 
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Figure 59 :Local Risk calculated by using BEQUAR Member N. 4’s input data 
 
 
1.E-11
1.E-09
1.E-07
1.E-05
1.E-03
1.E-01
1 10 100 1000 10000N 
F(y -1 )
K111 K211
K121 K131
K221
 
Figure 60: Societal Risk calculated by using BEQUAR Member N.4’s input data 
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Figure 61: Local Risk calculated by using BEQUAR Member N. 5’s input data 
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Figure 62: Societal Risk calculated by using BEQUAR Member N.5’s input data 
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Figure 63: Local Risk calculated by using BEQUAR Member N. 6’s input data 
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Figure 64: Societal Risk calculated by using BEQUAR Member N.6’s input data 
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Figure 65: Local Risk calculated by using BEQUAR Member N. 7’s input data 
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Figure 66: Societal Risk calculated by using BEQUAR Member N.7’s input data 
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Figure 67: Local Risk calculated by using BEQUAR Member N. 9’s input data 
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Figure 68: Societal Risk calculated by using BEQUAR Member N.9’s input data 
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Figure 69: Local Risk calculated by using BEQUAR Member N 10’s input data 
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Figure 70: Societal Risk calculated by using BEQUAR Member N.10’s input data 
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Figure 71: Local Risk calculated by using BEQUAR Member N 11’s input data 
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Figure 72: Societal Risk calculated by using BEQUAR Member N.11’s input data 
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Figure 73: Local Risk calculated by using BEQUAR Member N 12’s input data 
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Figure 74: Societal Risk calculated by using BEQUAR Member N.12’s input data 
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3.2 Scenario by Scenario analysis 
The present section summarises the comparison of the FN-curves obtained by using the 
reviewed data of the BEQUAR members. The analysis was conducted by separately 
considering the contribution to the overall risk by each single accident Scenario. 
 
Scenario K111 
54 t SO2 release to the environment as a consequence of the catastrophic rupture of the SO2 tank wagon due to 
mechanical impact with hydrochloric acid or alkali tank wagon.  
 
The comparison of the calculations for the different BEQUAR members for the K111 
Scenario is shown in Figure 75. All the FN-curves calculated by using the reviewed data of 
the BEQUAR members are clearly above the reference curve (red), which indicates their 
estimation for higher risk if compared to the reference analysis. The off-site potential of this 
Scenario was confirmed and it was considered as the ‘worst case’ Scenario by all the 
BEQUAR participants.  
 
As the members estimated higher values for the occurrence frequency of this Scenario (ca. 2 
order of magnitude on average), their F-N curves were vertically translated from the reference 
toward the higher frequency direction. For member n. 12 (cyan) it can be noticed also a 
distortion of the curve for high values of N. This is due to the fact that, amongst the different 
members who completed their analysis and therefore appearing in the figure, member n. 12 
was the only having chosen the more conservative probit model, which differs significantly 
from other selected models.  
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Figure 75: F-N curve for K111 Scenario: the different curves refer to the different BEQUAR members 
and are compared to the curve (red) of the reference risk analysis 
 
 
 
Scenario K121 
Isolable leakage of equivalent ø10 mm due to failure of the flange 
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The potential effects of Scenario K121 as assessed by the reference analysis are limited to a 
small area centrally located and embedded within the reference plant (on-site effects). 
However the relatively high estimated frequency makes it risk significant.  
 
The spread of responses by the BEQUAR members is quite relevant as shown in Figure 76 
although some members provided same outcome (i.e. 9 and 10 were equivalent to the 
reference, whilst 3 was equivalent to 5). The members who showed a more conservative 
approach are member n. 7 and member n. 12. Also in these cases, the major role was played 
by the selected models for assessing the vulnerability to sulphur oxide. As previously 
indicated, member 12 selected the most conservative probit model, whilst member 7 selected 
threshold limits which, in the present case, resulted in a more conservative approach for lower 
values of toxic concentration (i.e., in the range 1-300 mg/m3) if compared to the reference 
case. As for this Scenario lower concentration values play an important role, this is the reason 
why a similar behaviour for member 7 was not noticed in K111. 
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Figure 76: F-N curve for K121 Scenario: the different curves refer to the different BEQUAR members 
and are compared to the curve (red) of the reference risk analysis. The curves of members 9 and 10 do 
not appear because they superimpose with the reference. The curve of member 3 is underneath the 
curve of member 5 
 
The peculiarity of this Scenario in term of the uncertainty of its potential for producing off-
site risks, has suggested further investigation. In particular, during one of the project 
meetings, it was decided to make a thorough analysis on the effect of the assumption made 
i.e. the reaction time of the operators in case of release from the flange. The plant operator 
provided a reaction time of 20 minutes in case of proper functioning of the sensor system and 
30 minutes otherwise. This values account of the time necessary by the intervention operator 
to detect the release, to wear the proper protection equipment and to stop the release by 
closing the tank wagon valve, which is located on the top of the tank.  
 
The simulation was conducted by assuming longer reaction times (40, 60, 120 minutes), 
which refer to a situation in which the operator of the plant is unable to intervene due to 
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unexpected conditions. In such a case external intervention could be required. The results of 
the calculation are show in Figure 77 that shows a much more critical situation, which if 
combined also to a different choice of the vulnerability mode it would lead to a risk picture 
with significant off-site potential. 
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 Figure 77: K121 Scenario; FN-curve - Simulation for different values of the response time: 40, 60, 
and 120 minutes 
 
 
Although, the feedback of the members on the reaction and repair times reported in a previous 
session did not lead to significant differences with respect the reference analysis (see page 60) 
it should be emphasised the fact that response time depends very much on the specific 
procedures and the training activities put in place at the plant. As these aspects were not 
specifically explored by the BEQUAR members during their visit at the plant, it was 
commonly recognised that further detailed analysis is necessary. 
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Scenario K211 
54 t SO2 release to the environment as a consequence of the catastrophic rupture of the SO2 tank wagon due to 
mechanical impact during wagon change 
 
The comparison for K211 is particularly interesting because the reference analysis classified 
this Scenario as quite risk insignificant, due to the very low value of estimated frequency (10-
10 y-1). By contrast, the response of the BEQUAR member was quite different (see Figure 78). 
Four members (n. 4, 5, 6 and 11) presented FN-curves with the typical shape of catastrophic 
failure Scenarios. Their reviewed frequency of occurrence was much higher (10-8 - 10-4 y-1) 
than the reference value, which explain for this behaviour.  Members 7 and 12, who selected 
lower values of frequency, provided higher values of risk only for lower values of N (300 and 
100, respectively). 
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Figure 78: F-N curve for K211 Scenario: the different curves refer to the different BEQUAR members 
and are compared to the curve (red) of the reference risk analysis. The curve of members 3 does not 
appear because it is underneath the curve of member 5. The curve of member 9 is underneath the 
reference (negligible) 
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Scenario K221 
Not Isolable leakage of due to failure of flange connection AND failure of tank wagon valve; vertical outflow from 
ø40 mm during 10 minutes (time required for mounting the shut-off valve) 
 
The reference analysis ranked this Scenario as risk insignificant. This was due to the 
combination of a quite low estimated frequency (10-6 y-1) and the limited amount of substance 
release. Nevertheless, the FN-curves obtained by the BEQUAR members (Figure 79) tend to 
depict a different situation. Although the estimated risk is mainly associated to on-site 
situations (i.e. risk completely negligible for N>100), a number of BEQUAR members (n. 4, 
7 and 12) identified a risk picture of a certain relevance. For members n. 12 the same 
considerations expressed for the previous Scenarios (vulnerability models) can be made, 
whilst for members n. 4 and 9 it should be noticed that both the reviewed frequency and the 
response/repair times were higher if compared to the reference. 
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Figure 79: F-N curve for K221 Scenario: the different curves refer to the different BEQUAR members 
and are compared to the curve (red) of the reference risk analysis 
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Scenario K131 
Isolable leakage due to flexible pipe rupture AND failure of the protection valve (spring valve) 
 
The reference analysis ranked this Scenario as risk insignificant. This was due to the 
combination of a quite low estimated frequency (5 10-7 -1y ) and the limited amount of 
substance release. By contrast, the review of some BEQUAR members conducted to a 
different risk picture (Figure 80). Also in this case members n. 7 and 12 provided higher 
figures for the risk associated to this Scenario due to their higher reviewed frequency and the 
more conservative vulnerability models, which were used. Member n. 4 provided a much 
higher value for the reviewed frequency (5 10-4 -1y ).  
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Figure 80: F-N curve for K131 Scenario: the different curves refer to the different BEQUAR members 
and are compared to the curve (red) of the reference risk analysis 
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Scenario K151 
Not Isolable leakage of equivalent ø10 mm due to failure of the flange AND the tank wagon valve 
 
For this Scenario the reference analysis produced a quite small risk figure with negligible 
values for N>2. The response of some BEQUAR members is shown in Figure 81 where it 
should be noticed the higher risk estimated by members 7, 12 and 4.  
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Figure 81: F-N curve for K151 Scenario: the different curves refer to the different BEQUAR members 
and are compared to the curve (red) of the reference risk analysis. The curves of members 3, 5 and 10 
are equivalent with each other and are underneath the reference curve 
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Scenario K161 
Not Isolable leakage due to flexible pipe rupture AND failure of the protection valve (spring valve) AND tank 
wagon valve 
 
The reference analysis ranked this Scenario as risk insignificant. This was due to the 
combination of a quite low estimated frequency (2 10-9 -1y ) and the limited amount of 
substance release. Also for this case there is a number of BEQUAR members (Figure 82) for 
which the risk picture is rather different.  
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Figure 82: F-N curve for K161 Scenario: the different curves refer to the different BEQUAR members 
and are compared to the curve (red) of the reference risk analysis 
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Ethanol related Scenarios 
 
All the Scenarios associated to the release from the ethanol tanks where very risk 
insignificant. This is also due to the presence of the bund, which prevents the large spread of 
the release after the postulated catastrophic rupture of the tanks or the failure from the 
connecting pipe. For all tanks the estimated risk for a potential pool fire or explosion as 
estimated by the BEQUAR members was negligible and very often even smaller than the 
estimated risk by the reference analysis.  
 
As an example the calculation of the FN-curves for the Scenario consisting of a pool fire as 
resulting from the catastrophic release from the biggest tank (A11) are reported in Figure 83.  
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Figure 83: F-N curve for A11 Scenario (pool fire as a consequence of the catastrophic rupture of the 
A11 ethanol tank: the different curves refer to the different BEQUAR members and are compared to 
the curve (red) of the reference risk analysis. The curve of member 3 is underneath the curve of 
member 6, whist the curve of member 5 is underneath the reference curve 
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3.3 Summary of risk analysis review 
From the results presented in the previous sections, it can be established that, in general, the 
risk estimates obtained by using the reviewed data of the BEQUAR members are normally 
higher than those presented in the reference risk analysis. The only exception is with the 
ethanol related Scenarios, for which the estimated risk is very low in both cases.  
 
Such an increase is clearly associated to the general tendency by the BEQUAR members in 
assigning higher values for the frequency of the postulated Scenarios.  Nevertheless it should 
be noticed that -at least with the exception of the K111 Scenario- the review of the frequency 
data did not play a major role in quantitative terms. By contrast, the role of the different 
vulnerability models used for consequence assessment seems to have contributed more to a 
different outcome of the risk picture. 
 
A point to note is that, in the present analysis, great attention was paid to the influence of 
frequency data and of the vulnerability models on the final outcome of the risk analysis. For 
this reason several discussions on the choice of these parameters took place during the 
BEQUAR meetings. It was however shown that other aspects can play an important role on 
the overall risk picture. Unfortunately these aspects, which role is not immediately evident in 
the risk assessment process, are often not considered with the appropriate level of detail. It is 
the case of certain assumptions such as for instance the reaction time, which did not attract the 
due attention during the analysis phase but that it demonstrated to be much more risk sensitive 
then other parameters.  
 
Concerning the relevance of the different Scenarios to the overall risk the comparison of the 
reference analysis and of the members review is depicted in Figure 84. Scenarios K111 and 
K121 were considered by far as the most significant by both the reference analysis and the 
BEQUAR members. However the main difference is for K131, K161 and 211 which are 
totally negligible in the reference analysis, whilst they were considered as playing a minor 
role for the BEQUAR members.  
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Figure 84:  Contribution to the overall risk by the different scenarios. Purple bar: reference analysis; 
blue bar: BEQUAR members (average)  
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Finally, the differences in the risk picture amongst the BEQUAR members were quite evident 
both in terms of the absolute figure of risk and the relevance of the different Scenarios in 
contributing to the overall risk.  
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CONCLUSIONS 
General Remarks 
The focus of the benchmark described in this report was a reassessment, by independent 
reviewers, of an existing risk analysis. The selected chemical establishment used as the 
reference plant was an existing lower tier Seveso establishment. For the purposes of this 
exercise, a mock version of the original risk analysis was used.  This mock version was 
generated by reworking the original data, assumptions and calculations used in the original 
safety report of the reference plant and “relocating” the plant to a different environment.  
These measures were specifically intended to avoid any possible correlation of the results of 
this benchmarking with the actual risks associate with the existing plant.  
 
The participants in this benchmark study were a heterogeneous group, consisting of 
representatives of competent authorities from new Member States and candidate countries 
with responsibilities associated with implementation of the Seveso Directive in their 
countries.   Risk analysis experts working in research organisations were also represented in 
this group. All risk experts were explicitly asked to provide their feedback at different steps of 
the risk analysis process not only as risk analysts, but also taking into consideration the 
particular perspective and concerns of the competent authorities within their country.  
Typically, the competent authorities have responsibility for evaluating whether the risk 
analysis is acceptable and also applying the information in executing associated risk 
management responsibilities, particularly land-use and emergency planning. 
 
The main purpose of the benchmark study was to explore how independent evaluations by 
individual experts of the same risk analysis might differ in their findings and conclusions,  
and how these differences subsequently might influence the calculation of risk estimates 
associated with a particular zone of impact in the area surrounding the plant. By focusing the 
study on the evaluation of an already completed risk analysis, and its implications for a 
particular impact area, the benchmark study represented an approach to analysing risks of a 
chemical establishment closely aligned with the competent authority perspective. In this 
sense, the project differed significantly from previous benchmark studies coordinated by the 
JRC, that focussed on the independent execution of the risk analysis itself (rather than the 
review), by different teams of experts. 
 
The following sections summarise the general conclusions of the benchmark study for the 
different steps of the risk analysis. It is however necessary to emphasise the fact that, for the 
purposes of providing a clear and concise summary, some positions taken by group members  
had to be simplified, requiring that some details and nuances were omitted. The conclusions 
presented here, therefore, represent a summary of general trends related to the different 
perceptions of members of the BEQUAR group on several aspects of the risks being 
evaluated.  These conclusions do not pretend to provide an analysis, which is statistically 
significant.  
Hazard Identification Analysis 
The reference hazard identification analysis was considered as acceptable by the majority of 
the BEQUAR reviewers. There was some reluctance shared by a few concerning the lack of 
adequate details on possible mitigation actions. Regarding the credibility of Scenarios with 
high consequence/low probability character, the worst case Scenario (catastrophic rupture of 
the tank wagon due to collision with other tank) was debated the most in the group. However, 
it was broadly agreed that the competent authorities of their countries would require a detailed 
analysis of these Scenarios in any case regardless of their credibility. For all the other 
Scenarios there was a common agreement on the appropriateness of the Scenario description 
and on the assumptions made. The safeguards’ description was considered satisfactory 
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although some members suggested providing more details in the simplified HAZOP. 
Concerning events identified in the analysis as not having the potential to lead to an accident 
Scenario the group’s level of agreement was relatively lower and members demonstrated a 
notable lack of confidence and indecision in regard to judging this aspect. This tendency was 
particularly evident for cases involving tank overpressure. 
Frequency Data Review 
The original data provided by the operator were taken as a basis for this analysis. However, 
some of the original data, assumptions and calculation methods were slightly modified by the 
JRC in order to differentiate the benchmark study from the actual case. In this way it was 
possible to produce a consistent data set that differed from the original analysis and, therefore, 
could be the object of an open and unconstrained review. By following this approach the 
project avoided being side-tracked by complications, and particularly confrontations with the 
original reference plant, related to possible misinterpretation of the data or disagreement on 
the methods used to calculate the frequencies of the top events. The review of the accident 
Scenario frequency data was conducted on a Scenario-by-Scenario basis.  
 
For the sulphur dioxide tank wagon and all its Scenarios associated with the “mission start”, 
the benchmark study members demonstrated a clear preference for higher accident frequency 
values. The group’s response was notably homogeneous for the worst case Scenario (2 orders 
of magnitude higher) whilst a much greater variation in perspectives  was observed for the 
other two Scenarios. A point to note is that these Scenarios were driven by human factors-
related events, and for this reason, were considered by the benchmark study members as very 
difficult to assess.  Such events tend to  depend on a combination of several factors,  for 
instance: (i) the specific instructions and procedures which are available and used in the plant 
and (ii) the specific safety culture within the organisation involved. Such elements are usually 
company/plant specific and evaluating the adequacy of this aspect of the risk analysis is very 
difficult for the competent authorities. 
 
For the Scenarios related to the normal operation of the unloading of sulphur dioxide from the 
tank and that involve the failure of the three main components, that is, the  flange, the flexible 
pipe, and the spring protection valve, in general the response was quite homogeneous 
amongst the benchmark participants.  They also tended to prefer higher frequency values for 
these Scenarios. It is worth mentioning that the distribution of responses amongst the 
participants for the flexible pipe Scenario was much higher than for the other Scenarios, a fact 
attributable to the greater uncertainty associated with this type of component (which in turn is 
mainly due to the large variation in  the data found in literature).  
 
For ethanol related Scenarios the response of the members was quite uniform and in 
agreement with the reference value.   
 
A point to note is that frequency assessment is a quite delicate task in any Quantitative Risk 
Assessment process. This situation results from the uncertainty associated with the data and 
the related effect on the final outcome of the overall risk analysis. For this reason, a 
fundamental step in the benchmark was to obtain feedback from the BEQUAR reviewers in 
terms of their perceptions about the appropriateness of the frequency values selected and 
particular challenges for reviewers in assessing whether the selected values are appropriate for 
the situation . 
 
During discussions at the group’s final meeting, the risk consultant who provided the 
frequency data for the reference plant’s safety report argued that the frequency values 
proposed by some of the benchmark participants were often quite unrealistic and that the 
differences between their preferences and from the reference values actually used in some 
cases were extremely high. Moreover, he stated that in a number of instances their preferences 
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could, probably not be validated by existing data sources, which implied that some members 
were making judgements solely on the basis of their subjective views rather than the objective 
evidence.  Nonetheless, it was commonly recognised that, although the differences were 
perhaps a bit excessive for a few cases, uncertainty about frequency values is an ongoing and 
well known problem. What’s more, the results of this discussion and the study as a whole 
only further confirmed that the lack of access to reliable reference databases for evaluating 
specific process hazards within the competent authorities is a significant obstacle to making 
informed judgments about the frequency assessments selected by the operators. 
Consequence Assessment Review 
As the benchmark was conducted under a competent authority perspective, the review of the 
consequence assessment was restricted to certain specific aspects. In particular, the analysis of 
the damage curves obtained through modelling of toxic gas dispersion and/or 
pressure/temperature distributions was excluded from the evaluation exercise. This effort 
would have required knowledge of all the codes used for modelling calculations, and these 
codes are not necessarily in the possession of most competent authorities. Rather, the review 
was carried out on: (i) the conclusions relative to the ‘source terms’ and (ii) the vulnerability 
assessment (probit values & threshold limits). 
 
It was remarked by some  countries that for risk analyses similar to that used in the 
benchmark exercise, , the worst-case Scenario (catastrophic rupture of the sulphur dioxide 
tank wagon) would be the only Scenario considered for full evaluation. In other countries, 
there would be an additional requirement to elaborate a consequence assessment for all 
selected Scenarios.  
 
It was noted during the meeting discussions that no common methodology for consequence 
assessment is required in the majority of the new Member States or Candidate Countries.  It is 
the operator who is responsible for selecting the methodology and the tools to be used. 
Moreover, the competent authorities are rarely in possession of the proper tools or knowledge 
to evaluate or perform consequence assessment calculations. For this reasons it was suggested 
that short-cut methods could be very useful for Competent Authorities in order to assess the 
consequence calculations in the safety report. 
 
With regard to the calculation of the source terms, the majority of the benchmark study 
members considered that the calculations presented in the reference analysis were acceptable. 
 
Concerning the vulnerability models used in the benchmark: 
 
• For toxic related parameters, the benchmark responders did not show any specific 
preference for the proposed probit formulas. The same can be stated for the proposed 
threshold limits.  
• For heat radiation a wide distribution of responses was noticed. Indeed, for probit, all 
the proposed formulas were the subject of comment;  TNO and DNV were rated 
highest. The threshold limits selected by the different responders also varied quite 
significantly. Some of the reviewers also proposed some alternative values. 
• For overpressure-related Scenarios, the probit formula of TNO was the definitive 
favourite. As a threshold limit, 1 bar was estimated to be the blast wave effect by the 
majority of responders. 
 
Regardless of the preferred values or formulas, in general it was commonly agreed that all of 
them could be considered acceptable for safety report purposes. In addition, the discussions 
also acknowledged the ongoing diffiulty of which of the available formulas are the most 
reliable. For this reason, it was argued that a case-by-case approach should be followed for 
selecting the suitable model, influenced in particular by the type of potential impact predicted 
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within each Scenario and the underlying assumptions. However, it should be noticed that the 
choice of a specific formula is often driven by practical factors such as, for instance, its 
availability in the literature or open sources. 
 
In summary, the comments and discussions during the project highlighted the following 
interesting and important points concerning consequence assessment in the new Member 
States and Candidate Countries:  
• The position of the competent authorities in the new Member States and Candidate 
Countries is more or less in line with what it is considered acceptable in the EU-15.  
• By and large, no common methodology for consequence analysis has been strictly 
required in the new Member States. Moreover, the new Member States would gladly 
welcome further guidance in this field.   
• The codes for performing modelling calculations are not broadly available. This 
situation is a further impediment for the competent authorities in effective 
implementation of their oversight responsibilities.   
Risk Analysis Review  
The modifications of the data suggested by each of the participants were each re-inserted into 
the modelling calculations to produce a corresponding re-calculation of the risk estimate for 
the impact area.   This exercise produced a number of different alternative risk estimates.   
 
The differences between the estimates showed quite clearly the strong influence of the 
differences of opinion amongst the benchmark reviewers on the models and data that should 
be used .  The final calculated risk estimates differed considerably, both in terms of the 
absolute risk number and the relevance of the different Scenarios in contributing to the overall 
risk.  
 
Sulphur dioxide tank wagon 
For the sulphur dioxide tank wagon, the estimated risks were generally higher than those 
presented in the reference risk analysis. This kind of difference might be attributable to the 
tendency of the benchmark study participants to assign higher accident frequency values for 
the different Scenarios, although that particular parameter did not seem to play a major role in 
quantitative terms in the overall case (with the single exception of the worst case Scenario).  
 
In fact, the choice of the selected models for assessing the vulnerability played a much more 
critical role. When the most conservative models were used,  the risk estimates were 
substantially different from the reference analysis.  
 
The viewpoint of the benchmark study members also produced some marked differences from 
the reference  analysis in regard to the way in which different Scenarios influenced the final 
risk estimate. In particular, some of the Scenarios considered totally negligible in the 
reference analysis were in fact still considered significant to the risk calculation by the 
benchmark reviewers.  
 
Ethanol tanks 
For the ethanol tanks, the calculation of risk estimates a potential pool fire or explosion using 
the various modified data suggested by the benchmark participants produced negligible 
results, very often smaller than the risk estimates calculated within the reference analysis.  
 
 
As a final comment, considering the review as a whole, it should be emphasised that in this 
review took particular note of the influence of frequency data and of the vulnerability models 
on the final outcome of the risk analysis. For this reason the choice of these parameters was 
the subject of several discussions over the course of the project. Nonetheless, it was also 
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demonstrated that other aspects, for example, reaction time, may play an important role in the 
overall risk analysis. Unfortunately, the significance of these aspects is not often immediately 
evident in the risk assessment process, and consequently, they are not often considered with 
the appropriate level of detail. To illustrate, reaction time did not attract much attention during 
the review of the data and assumptions but a sensitivity analysis of the final risk estimate 
clearly showed that the outcome is much more sensitive to the influence of this parameter 
than other parameters. In particular, a simulation was conducted assuming longer reaction 
times in comparison to the reference analysis (which was 20 minutes).  This exercise 
demonstrated that the risk can be substantially augmented if, for whatever reason, the operator 
is delayed in taking appropriate corrective action beyond the normal expected time frame.   
Final Remarks 
All the participants recognised that the benchmark study had been an effective mechanism for 
identifying the weakness and strengths within their own country’s strategy for reviewing the 
risk analyses of safety reports. The study created an active discussion platform, focussing on 
current practices and approaches use by the participating countries for analysing risk 
associated with Seveso-type establishments. Additionally, this approach allowed a productive 
exchange of information to take place amongst the participants on several aspects concerning 
the implementation of the Seveso Directive in their countries. In particular, this information 
exchange was highly valued by the study members given the recent entrance into force of the 
Directive in the new Member States and Candidate Countries. 
 
In comparison to previous JRC benchmark exercises of this type, the current benchmark study 
showed a quite significant variation in the opinions of participants on individual elements. 
This variation was present for all the different steps of the risk analysis process. The main 
cause of the wide distribution of opinions was clearly associated with the intrinsic uncertainty 
of the risk analysis process. 
 
In contrast to previous benchmark exercises, where different risk assessors performed their 
own independent analysis of the same reference establishment, the present benchmark 
consisted of independent reviews of the same risk analysis study. Notwithstanding the 
variation in opinion was not less significant than for previous studies. 
 
The following comments were made during the final meeting discussions: 
 
• Uncertainly is a key issue. All Scenarios classified as most dangerous have to be 
carefully analysed in order to manage uncertainty.  
• Human factor analysis is an essential element and should be incorporated in any 
safety assessment study for Seveso purposes. 
• The benchmark study showed that the overall risk estimate is very much influenced 
by the vulnerability model selected. The choice of this model is a crucial to the 
outcome of the analysis, as it is a main contributor to the uncertainty of the final 
result. 
• On occasion the worst case Scenarios may receive too much scrutiny in proportion to 
their likelihood. The comparison between K111 and K121 is a good illustration of 
this problem, where  the underlying assumptions were subjected to substantial 
discussion (e.g., reaction & repair times). 
• Due to the intrinsic uncertainty associated with the risk analysis, the absolute value of 
the risk estimate is not necessarily the most important outcome of the overall process. 
Rather, the QRA framework necessitates a detailed analysis of the risk situation, 
which leads to a better understanding of the systems and processes involved and 
highlighting which are the critical elements.  
• It should be noted that for very complex installations a full QRA could be very 
difficult to evaluate. The amount of information required can be significant and the 
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corresponding uncertainty associated with each parameter may therefore also be very 
difficult to estimate. Detailed guidance on how to evaluate a risk analysis study from 
a regulator’s standpoint would be extremely useful for the new Member States and 
Candidate Countries.  
 
Finally the use of the ARIPAR software to improve the inter-comparability of the results, was 
considered to have added good value to the benchmarking process. A quantitative risk 
assessment application focusing on area risk where than risk associated with a single 
establishment, ARIPAR can produce inputs to  risk management decisions that are highly 
specific  concerning the risks and potential consequences associated with a particular area due 
to the presence of a particular activities and particular risk reduction solutions for that area.  
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APPENDIX I (HAZOP) 
 
The present appendix gives the results of the HAZOP for the reference plant.  
 
This was completed by the anonymous operator and the contracted consultancy company in 
charge of the risk analysis. All references to names have deliberately been eliminated.  
 
For each top event, a first estimate of the risk has been given by using the risk matrix shown 
below.  
 
 
 
 1 - SEVERITY 2 - SEVERITY 3 - SEVERITY 4 - SEVERITY 
1 - LIKELIHOOD 1 2 3 4 
2 - LIKELIHOOD 2 4 6 8 
3 - LIKELIHOOD 3 6 9 12 
4 - LIKELIHOOD 4 8 12 16 
 
SEVERITY Notes 
1 In-site health injury or health impacts 
2 In-site personal accidents or severe injury 
3 Out-site death or severe lethal impacts 
4 Out-site large number of death 
LIKELIHOOD Notes 
1 Not accepted to occur during facility life 
2 Could occur once during facility life 
3 Could occur several times during facility life 
4 Could occur on an annual basis (or more offen) 
Risk Ranking Values 
(Risk Ranking) Notes 
1 In-site risk 
2 In-site risk 
3 Small and middle out-site risk 
4 Small and middle out-site risk 
6 Small and middle out-site risk 
8 Large out-site risk 
9 Large out-site risk 
12 Large out-site risk 
16 Large out-site risk 
 
    
  Page ii 
1. SULPHUR DIOXIDE 
Present HAZOP meeting Duration Leader Recorder 
Name presence 
Anonymous Yes 
Anonymous Yes 
Anonymous Yes 
Anonymous Yes 
1. 2002-12-13 4,00 Anonymous Anonymous 
Anonymous Yes 
 Node: 1. Sulphur-dioxide tank wagon in the plant. 
Type: 
Drawing: 
1.1. Tank rupture 
Toxic 
Conseq. 
Causes Consequences 
S L RR
*
Protections Safeguards Scenario Notes 
1. Mechanic 
impact 
(hydrochloric acid 
or alkali tank 
wagon, once in 
every 2 -3 weeks). 
1.1. 54 t SO2 
release to the 
environment. 
4 1 4     1.1. 54 t SO2 
release to the 
environment in 
the consequence 
of the catastrophic 
rupture of tank 
wagon. Tank 
temperature: 40 
Co; pressure: 
tension related to 
40 Co; height: 1.1 
m; outflow to 
concrete surface, 
no bund. 
  
* S: Severity, L: Likelihood, RR: Risk Ranking 
1.2. Isolable SO2 leakage on the pipe, before the pipefailure protector valve 
Toxic 
Conseq. 
Causes Consequences 
S L RR 
Protections Safeguards Scenario Notes 
1.1. 8 pcs of 
SO2 sensor, 
5 ppm 
sensitivity. 
1. Flange leakage. 1.1. Small amount 
of SO2 release to 
the environment. 
1 3 3 
1.2. 
Presence of 
the operator 
crew, 
observes the 
leakage in 
10 minutes 
and after 
fends the 
failure in 20 
minutes. 
  1.1. Flange leakage 
of equivalent ø10 
mm; horizontal 
outflow during 20 
minutes (when 
SO2 sensors are 
available) or 
during 30 minutes 
(when SO2 sensors 
are not available); 
height: 5 m; 
pressure: tension 
related to 40 Co.  
 
1.1. The SO2 
sensors’ central 
unit is supplied 
and the 8 sensors 
are feeded from 
the central. 
1.3. Isolable SO2 leakage on the flexible pipe. 
Toxic 
Conseq. 
Causes Consequences 
S L RR 
Protections Safeguards Scenario Notes 
                                                     
* S: Severity; L: Likelihood; RR: Risk Ranking  
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1.1. 8 pcs of 
SO2 sensor, 5 
ppm 
sensitivity 
1. Flexible pipe-
end rupture and 
failure of the 
piperupture 
protector-valve. 
1.1. Small 
amount of 
SO2 release 
to the 
environment. 
1 3 3 
1.2. Presence 
of the operator 
crew, observes 
the leakage in 
10 minutes 
and after fends 
the failure in 
20 minutes. 
  1.1. Flexible pipe-
end rupture; 
vertical outflow 
from ø25 mm; 
during 20 minutes 
(when SO2 sensors 
are available) or 
during 30 minutes 
(when SO2 sensors 
are not available); 
height: 5 m; 
pressure: tension 
related to 40 Co.  
 
  
1.4. Isolable SO2 leakage before the starch industry on the pipe bridge 
Toxic Conseq. Causes Consequences 
S L RR 
Protections Safeguards Scenario Notes 
1. Flexible pipe-
end rupture and 
failure of the 
pipefailure 
protector- and the 
drain-valve. 
1.1. Small 
amount of SO2 
release to the 
environment. 
1 2 2 1.1. Presence 
of the operator 
crew, observes 
the leakage in 
10 minutes 
and after fends 
the failure in 
20 minutes. 
    1.1. 
Horizontal 
leakage at 
DN 25 mm at 
the height of 
7 m for 30 
minutes. 
1.5. Not isolable SO2 leakage on the pipe, before the pipefailure protector valve 
Toxic Conseq.Causes Consequences 
S L RR 
Protections Safeguards Scenario Notes 
1.1. 8 pcs of 
SO2 sensor, 5 
ppm 
sensitivity 
1. Flange leakage 
and the valve of 
the wagon is 
unlockable. 
1.1. Great amount 
of SO2 release to 
the environment. 
2 2 4 
1.2. Presence 
of the operator 
crew, observes 
the leakage in 
10 minutes 
and after fends 
the failure in 
30 minutes. 
1.Stopping the 
leakage is 
recommended 
on the spot, by 
mounting a 
flanged shutoff 
valve. 
 
1.1. Flange 
leakage of 
equivalent ø10 
mm; vertical 
outflow during 20 
min. – 
immediately 
sensor signal, 20 
min. for action 
(when SO2 
sensors are 
available) or 
during 30 min. – 
10 min. for 
diagnosis, 20 min. 
for action (when 
SO2 sensors are 
not available); and 
following that 
vertical outflow 
from ø40 mm 
during 10 minutes 
– mounting the 
shut-off valve 
height: 5 m; 
pressure: tension 
related to 40 Co. 
 
1.1.For the 
first 30 (10 + 
20) minutes 
they are 
trying to fend 
the failure 
and after they 
mount a 
shutoff valve 
on the wagon 
in 10 
minutes. 
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1.6. Not isolable SO2 leakage on the flexible pipe. 
Toxic Conseq.Causes Consequences 
S L RR 
Protections Safeguards Scenario Notes 
1.1. 8 pcs of 
SO2 sensor, 5 
ppm 
sensitivity 
1. Flexible pipe-
end rupture and 
failure of the 
piperupture 
protector- and the 
drain-valve. 
1.1. Great amount 
of SO2 release to 
the environment 
2 2 4 
1.2. Presence 
of the operator 
crew, observes 
the leakage in 
10 minutes 
and after fends 
the failure in 
30 minutes. 
2. Stopping the 
leakage is 
recommended 
on the spot, by 
mounting a 
flanged shutoff 
valve.  
1.1.Flexible pipe-
end rupture; 
vertical outflow 
from ø25 mm; 
during 20 min. – 
immediately 
sensor signal, 20 
min. for action 
(when SO2 
sensors are 
available) or 
during 30 min. – 
10 min. for 
diagnosis, 20 min. 
for action (when 
SO2 sensors are 
not available); and 
following that 
vertical outflow 
from ø40 mm 
during 10 minutes 
– mounting the 
shut-off valve; 
height: 5 m; 
pressure: tension 
related to 40 Co. 
 
1.1. For the 
first 30 (10 + 
20) minutes 
they are 
trying to fend 
the failure 
and after 
mount the 
flanged 
hutoff valve 
on the wagon 
in 10 
minutes. 
1.7. nem kizárható SO2 kifújás a keményítő üzem előtti csőhídon 
Toxic 
Conseq. 
Causes Consequences 
S L RR 
Protecti
ons 
Safeguards Scenari
o 
Notes 
1. Flexible pipe-
end rupture and 
failure of the 
pipefailure 
protector- and the 
drain-valve and the 
valve of the wagon 
is not lockable. 
1.1. Great amount 
of SO2 release to the 
environment 
2 1 2 1.1. Presence 
of the operator 
crew, observes 
the leakage in 
10 minutes and 
after fends the 
failure in 30 
minutes 
5. Stopping the 
flow is 
recommended 
on the spot, by 
mounting a 
flanged shutoff 
valve. 
  1.1. Great amount of 
SO2 release to the 
environment in 
vertical direction, 
at environmental 
temerapture, at 
atmospheric 
pressure at the 
height of 5 m, for 
30 minutes at DN 
25 mm, and after 
for 10 minutes at 
DN 40 mm. 
1.8. Overpressure in the tank wagon 
Toxic 
Conseq. 
Causes Consequences 
S L RR 
Protections Safeguards Scenario Notes 
1. Weather 
conditions and tank 
overheat. 
1.1. SO2 leak 
reaction for the 
pressure increase. 
1 2 2 1.1. Tank 
wagons safety 
valve blows 
off. 
    1.1. 200 kg 
SO2, in the 
tank wagon, 
temperature 
increase, 50 
Co
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Node: 2. Sulphur-dioxide wagon change 
Type: 
Drawing: 
2.1. Tank rupture 
Toxic Conseq.Causes Consequences 
S L RR 
Protections Safeguards Scenario Notes 
1. Mechanic 
impact 
1.1. 54 t SO2 
release to the 
environment. 
4 1 4 1.1. Spragger 
and clearance 
protection. 
3. It is 
recommended 
not to rack 
hydrochloric 
acid or alkali 
during wagon 
changing. 
1.1. 54 t SO2 
release to the 
environment to 
concrete surface at 
the height of 1.1 
m, the temperature 
of the tank is 40 
Co and the 
pressure tension 
relating to this 
temperature. 
  
2.2. not isolable SO2 release before the shut-off valve line 
Toxic Conseq.Causes Consequences 
S L RR 
Protections Safeguards Scenario Notes 
1. Flange or 
connecting fails 
and the drain-valve 
fails. 
1.1. Great amount 
of SO2 release to 
the environment. 
2 2 4 1.1. Two 
persons are to 
ensure the 
process and 
they mount a 
flanged 
shutoff valve 
in 10 minutes. 
4. The soonest 
intervention to 
stop the flow, 
by the locker 
armature, what 
is kept at the 
crew. 
1.1. Vertical 
outflow from tank 
wagon valve 
flange ø40 mm 
during 10 minutes 
– mounting the 
shut-off valve; 
height: 5 m; 
pressure: tension 
related to 40 Co in 
the consequence 
of the tank wagon 
valve failure. 
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2. ETHANOL STORAGE 
 
Sessions Report 2003-02-23 
Present HAZOP meeting Duration Leader Reporter 
Name Presence 
Anonymous Yes 
Anonymous Yes 
Anonymous Yes 
Anonymous Yes 
Anonymous Yes 
1. 2002-12-13 2,00 Anonymous Anonymous 
Anonymous Yes 
Node: 1. 1-2-3-10 tanks 
Type: 
Drawing: 
1.1. Catastrophic rupture. 
Flammable 
Conseq. 
Causes Consequences 
S L RR 
Protections Safeguards Scenario Notes 
1. Material defect. 1.1. 5000 or 2000 
or 930 or 230 m3 
alcohol release. 
4 1 4 1.1. Bunds 
separetly are 
enough. 
  1.1. 5000 or 2000 
or 930 or 230 m3 
alcohol release to 
the environment, 
environmental 
temperature, 
atmosferic 
pressure, in he 
consequence of  
the catastrophic 
rupture of the 
tank. 
1.1. Bunds’ 
area in order 
are: 
• 1: 1500 
m2 
• 2. 817 m2
• 3. 900 m2
• 10. 100 
m2 
2.1. Bunds’ 
area in order 
are: 
• 1100m2 
• 617m2 
• 700m2 
• 10. 75m2
2.Pipe branch 
rupture on a not 
isolatable section. 
2.1. 5000 or 2000 
or 930 or 230 m3 
alcohol release. 
4 1 4 2.1. Bunds 
separetly are 
enough. 
2. Planting of 
alcohol 
detectors, that 
are signing for a 
small amount 
also. 
2.1. 5000 or 2000 
or 930 or 230 m3 
alcohol release to 
the environment, 
at DN 80 mm at 
environmental 
temperature and 
atmosferic 
pressure. The 
discharge 
velocity depends 
on the hydrostatic 
head. Liquid 
levels in order 
are: 13.2m, 10m, 
4.65m, 9.4m. 
2.2. release 
times are: 
• 5000 
m3:45 óra
• 2000 m3: 
21 óra 
• 930 m3: 
14 óra 
• 230 m3: 
2.5 óra 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
       
 
 
Overpressure in the tanks 
Flammable 
Conseq. 
Causes Consequences 
S L RR 
Protections Safeguard
s 
Scenario Notes
    
  Page vii 
1.1. Minimal 
overpressure in the 
tank 
1 2 2 1.1.Resistance of the tankwall and the 
additional volume of the outward 
bulge 
1. 
Vacuum/pressure 
safety valve 
1.2. Minimal 
vacuum in the tank. 
1 2 2 1.2. Resistance of the tankwall and 
the missing volume of the inward 
bulge 
      
1.3. Pressure decrease during unloading 
Flammable 
Conseq. 
Causes Consequences 
S L RR 
Protections Safeguards Scenario Notes 
1. Loss of power 
supply 
1.1. small amount 
of alcohol release 
1 1 1         
1.4. Rupture of pipe next to the tanks. 
Flammable 
Conseq. 
Causes Consequences 
S L RR 
Protections Safeguards Scenario Notes 
1. External 
mechanic impact 
(tree, truck, etc) 
1.1. Small amount 
of alcohol release 
to the environment 
at NA 80 mm at the 
height of 6 m 
horizontally, max. 
5 m3 (the power of 
the pump is 15 m3 
per hour, 15 m high 
tank, 20 min. 
flow.). 
1 1 1         
Node: 2. 6-7 tanks 
Type: 
Drawing: 
2.1. Catastrophic rupture 
Flammable 
Conseq. 
Causes Consequences 
S L RR 
Protections Safeguards Scenario Notes 
1. Material defect. 1.1. 700 m3 alcohol 
release to the 
environment. 
4 1 4 1.1. Bunds 
separetly are 
enough. 
  1.1. 700 m3 
alcohol release to 
the environment 
at evironmental 
temperature and 
pressure, in the 
consequence of 
the catastrophic 
rupture of the 
tanks NO. A/6 or 
A/7. 
1.1. Bunds’ 
area in order 
are: 
• 6. 113 
m2 
• 7. 113m2
2. Pipe branch 
rupture on a not 
isolatable section. 
2.1. 700 m3 alcohol 
release to the 
environment. 
4 1 4 2.1. Bunds 
separetly are 
enough. 
3. Planting of 
alcohol 
detectors, that 
are signing for a 
small amount 
also. 
2.1. 700 m3 
alcohol release to 
the environment, 
at DN 80 mm at 
environmental 
temperature and 
pressure, of the 
tanks No. A/6 or 
A/7. Liquid 
level: 8.9 m. 
2.1 Bunds’ 
area in order 
are: 
• 6. 34,5 
m2 
• 7. 
34,5m2 
 
2.2. Overpressure in tanks 
Flammable 
Conseq. 
Causes Consequences 
S L RR 
Protections Safeguards Scenario Notes 
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1.1. Minimal 
overpressure in the 
tank. 
1 2 2 1.1.Resistance of the tankwall and 
the additional volume of the 
outward bulge. 
1. 
Vacuum/pressure 
safety valve. 
1.2. Minimal 
vacuum in the tank. 
1 2 2 1.2. Resistance of the tankwall and 
the missing volume of the inward 
bulge. 
      
2.3. pressure decrees at the unloading 
Flammable 
Conseq. 
Causes Consequences 
S L RR 
Protections Safeguards Scenario Notes 
1. Loss of power 
supply. 
1.1. Small amount 
of alcohol release. 
1 1 1         
2.4. Rupture of the pipe next to the tanks 
Flammable 
Conseq. 
Causes Consequences 
S L RR 
Protections Safeguards Scenario Notes 
1. External 
mechanic impact 
(tree, truck, etc). 
1.1. alcohol release 
to the environment 
at DN 80 mm at the 
height of 6 m, 
horizontally max. 5 
m3 (the power of the 
pump is 15 m3 per 
hour, 15 m high 
tank, 20 min. flow.) 
1 1 1         
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